Daf Yomi · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · Standard
Chullin 74
Sugya Map
The sugya on Chullin 74a investigates the limits of shechitah (ritual slaughter) as an ontological and legal transformer. It explores how shechitah affects tissues and entities that are physically attached to the animal but occupy a liminal halakhic state. The discussion revolves around three primary axes:
- Axis A: The Metaphysics of Nibul (Hanging Limbs): Does the act of slaughter cause a partially severed limb (eiver hameduldal) to be viewed as if it had already fallen off prior to slaughter (shechitah oseh nipul)? If so, the limb is biblically forbidden as eiver min ha-chai (a limb from a living animal). If not, the slaughter successfully permits it.
- Axis B: The Legal Status of the Fetus (Ubbar): Is a fetus considered a physical extension of its mother (ubbar yerech imo) or an independent entity (ubbar lav yerech imo)? This conceptual split determines whether the mother's slaughter permits a live nine-month-old fetus (ben pekua) without its own shechitah.
- Axis C: The Mechanics of Shechitat Em (Maternal Slaughter): Does the mother's slaughter physically extend to the fetus, or does the Torah establish a unique, non-physical mechanism that permits the fetus? This affects the status of its fat (chelev), blood (dam), and its eligibility for redeeming a firstborn donkey (peter chamor).
Nafka Minot (Halakhic Ramifications)
- Biblical vs. Rabbinic Prohibitions: Whether eating a hanging limb after slaughter violates the biblical prohibition of eiver min ha-chai or is merely a Rabbinic infraction Chullin 74a:1.
- Ritual Impurity (Tumat Nevelah): Whether a dead fetus inside a slaughtered mother is treated as a carcass or is purified by the mother's slaughter Chullin 74a:8.
- Redemption of a Firstborn Donkey (Peter Chamor): Whether a live-born ben pekua is categorized as a living "lamb" (seh) capable of redeeming a firstborn donkey under Exodus 13:13, or as "slaughtered meat in a leather bag" (bashi b'khis) Chullin 74a:14.
- Susceptibility to Impurity (Hekhsher לקבל טומאה): Whether the fetus is rendered susceptible to impurity by the mother's blood or requires independent contact with water Chullin 74a:15.
Primary Sources
- Torah: Leviticus 11:32, Leviticus 11:35, Leviticus 11:39, Exodus 13:13.
- Mishnah/Gemara: Chullin 72a, Chullin 73a, Chullin 74a, Bekhorot 9a, Bekhorot 12a.
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Text Snapshot
The Gemara on Chullin 74a:1 addresses the status of hanging limbs:
"אין בהם אלא מצות פרוש בלבד"
Rashi on this passage explains:
"אין בהם - איסור לאו של אבר מן החי... אלא מצות פרוש - בעלמא מדרבנן וקרא אסמכתא בעלמא. אלמא אין שחיטה עושה ניפול" (Rashi on Chullin 74a:1:1-2).
Philological and Grammatical Nuance
The phrase mizvat perishah (מצות פרוש) represents a shift from an objective prohibition (issur) to a subjective command to separate oneself. The root p-r-sh (פ-ר-ש) denotes distance or boundaries. Unlike issur, which points to an inherent defect in the object (cheftza), perishah functions as a protective measure for the person (gavra). It is a Rabbinic safeguard designed to avoid the appearance of consuming a limb from a living animal.
The term nipul (ניפול), from the root n-f-l (נ-פ-ל - to fall), refers to a limb that is halakhically deemed to have fallen off before death. The debate hinges on whether shechitah acts as a severing agent. If shechitah oseh nipul, the slaughter itself cuts the legal tie between the limb and the body, rendering the limb forbidden. If shechitah eino oseh nipul, the physical connection remains halakhically intact through the slaughter, and the limb is permitted.
Readings
To analyze the legal status of the hanging limb (eiver hameduldal) and the ben pekua, we must examine the commentary of both Rishonim and Acharonim.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Status of the Fetus (Ben Pekua) and │
│ Hanging Limbs on Chullin 74a │
└────────────────────┬────────────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Physical Identity Model │ │ Metaphysical Decree Model │
│ (Fetus/Limb as Mother's Body) │ │ (Independent Halakhic Unit) │
├─────────────────────────────────┤ ├─────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Ubbar yerech imo. │ │ • Ubbar lav yerech imo. │
│ • Shechitah permits it naturally│ │ • Mother's shechitah is a │
│ as part of the mother's body. │ │ special decree (gezerat │
│ • Hanging limb is purified │ │ hakativ) that permits it. │
│ because it is "gufa" (body). │ │ • Fetus is "davar she'eino │
│ • (Rashi, Tosafot, Rambam) │ │ gufa" (distinct entity). │
│ │ │ • (Rabbi Meir, Resh Lakish) │
└─────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────────────┘
Reading 1: Tosafot on the Dichotomy of "Gufa" vs. "Davar She'eino Gufa"
Tosafot address a challenge regarding the relationship between a hanging limb and a fetus Chullin 74a:1:1. In Chullin 73a, the Baraita compares the purification power of slaughtering a tereifah (an animal with a terminal defect) to that of a hanging limb:
"לא אם טיהרה שחיטת טרפה אותה ואת האבר המדולדל בה..."
Tosafot ask: If the hanging limb is biblically permitted for consumption (mad'oraita shari b'akhilah), why does the Baraita use it as an example of something purified by shechitat tereifah? What is the connection between a hanging limb and a fetus?
Tosafot resolve this by distinguishing between two categories:
- Gufa (Its Body): A hanging limb is physically part of the animal's body. Even though the Rabbis prohibited eating it, they did not extend this decree to treat it as a separate entity regarding ritual impurity. Therefore, the slaughter of a tereifah purifies the hanging limb from tumat nevelah because it remains part of the animal's body.
- Davar She'eino Gufa (An External Entity): A fetus is a distinct entity. Because it is not considered part of the mother's own body in the same way a limb is, it requires a different halakhic mechanism to be purified or permitted.
Through this distinction, Tosafot establish that physical attachment does not automatically translate to halakhic unity. A hanging limb is physically compromised but legally remains part of the body (gufa). A fetus is physically whole but legally occupies an external status (davar she'eino gufa). This distinction shapes how shechitah applies to each.
Reading 2: The Rambam's Dual-Track Classification of the Ben Pekua
The Rambam addresses the status of a ben pekua (a live nine-month-old fetus found inside a slaughtered animal) in two different contexts: Hilkhot Shechitah and Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Assurot.
In Hilkhot Shechitah 1:14, the Rambam writes:
"בן פקועה שנמצא חי בבטן אמו... שחיטת אמו מועלת לו ואינו טעון שחיטה" (A ben pekua found alive in its mother's womb... its mother's slaughter is effective for it, and it does not require its own slaughter.)
Yet, in Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Assurot 4:5, the Rambam rules that its prohibited fat (chelev) is permitted:
"חלב של בן פקועה מותר באכילה" (The fat of a ben pekua is permitted for consumption.)
This presents a conceptual tension. If the ben pekua is alive and running in the field, why does it not require shechitah? If it is considered legally "slaughtered" by its mother's shechitah, why are its fat and blood permitted? For a standard animal, the Torah prohibits chelev under Leviticus 3:17 even after shechitah.
The Rambam’s position can be understood through two different interpretations:
- The Physical Identity Interpretation: The fetus is treated as a limb of the mother (ubbar yerech imo). When the mother is slaughtered, all her internal organs and limbs are permitted. Just as the mother's kidneys and their surrounding fat are permitted after her slaughter, the fetus and its fat are permitted because the fetus is legally just another organ of the mother.
- The Metaphysical Decree Interpretation: The Torah treats the mother's slaughter as a special decree (gezerat hakatuv) that permits the fetus. This decree does not merely extend the mother's permit to the fetus; it redefines the fetus as "slaughtered meat in a leather bag." Under this view, the ben pekua is no longer classified as a living animal (chai). It is halakhically dead and processed, even as it runs through the field. Because it is legally meat, the standard prohibitions of chelev (which apply only to living, slaughterable species) do not apply to it.
This explains the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Resh Lakish on Chullin 74a:13:
"אמר ריש לקיש: לדעת המתרים את החלב, מתירים את הדם... ורבי יוחנן אמר: אף לדעת המתרים את החלב, אוסרים את הדם."
Resh Lakish holds that if the fetus is legally "meat," both its fat and its blood are permitted because they are no longer subject to the prohibitions of a living animal. Rabbi Yoḥanan argues that even if the fat is permitted, the blood remains forbidden. This is because blood represents the active life-force (nefesh) of the fetus, which is physically present as long as the animal is alive and moving.
Reading 3: Maharam Schiff on Sifra and the Category of "Yish b'Mino Shechitah"
On Chullin 74a:10, the Gemara asks how the Tanna of the Baraita knows that the slaughter of a tereifah purifies it from the impurity of a carcass (tumat nevelah):
"וטרפה דשחיטה מטהרתה מנא ליה?"
The Gemara answers that it is derived from the verse:
"וכי ימות מן הבהמה אשר היא לכם לאכלה" Leviticus 11:39
The word min (מן - "from") is interpreted as a limiting term, indicating that only some dead animals impart impurity, excluding a slaughtered tereifah.
In his commentary on Chullin 74a:2 (d"h Nafka lei m'R.Y.), the Maharam Schiff addresses a difficulty. Why does the Gemara need a special verse to teach that a tereifah is purified by shechitah? Why not derive it from the general rule of non-kosher animals?
The Maharam Schiff explains that there is a fundamental difference between two categories of animals:
- Ein b'Mino Shechitah (Species not subject to slaughter): Non-kosher species (like camels or pigs) and eight-month-old fetuses are species for which the concept of ritual slaughter does not exist. Since shechitah is not a valid concept for these species, it cannot purify them from impurity.
- Yish b'Mino Shechitah (Species subject to slaughter): A tereifah belongs to a kosher species that is subject to the laws of shechitah. Even though this specific animal is physically defective and cannot be eaten, it still belongs to a class of animals that are subject to slaughter.
Because a tereifah belongs to a species subject to slaughter, one might have thought its shechitah would automatically purify it from tumat nevelah. However, since it is forbidden to be eaten, we might also have compared it to non-kosher animals and concluded that its slaughter is ineffective. Therefore, the Torah needs a specific verse (gezerat hakatuv) to teach that the slaughter of a tereifah successfully purifies it from the impurity of a carcass.
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Categorization of Species │
│ under Maharam Schiff │
└────────────────┬────────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Ein b'Mino Shechitah │ │ Yish b'Mino Shechitah │
├─────────────────────────────────┤ ├─────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Species for which shechitah │ │ • Species for which shechitah │
│ is legally non-existent. │ │ is a valid legal concept. │
│ • Examples: Non-kosher animals, │ │ • Examples: Kosher animals, │
│ eight-month-old fetuses. │ │ physically defective tereifot.│
│ • Shechitah can never purify │ │ • Shechitah can purify them │
│ them from tumat nevelah. │ │ from tumat nevelah. │
└─────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────────────┘
Reading 4: Brisker Lomdus on the Nature of Shechitat Em
Rav Chaim Soloveitchik [^1] analyzes the mechanics of how the mother's slaughter permits the fetus. He presents two possible conceptual models for shechitat em:
- Model A: The Identity Model (Yerech Imo). Under this model, the fetus is legally a limb of the mother. The mother's shechitah does not target the fetus directly; rather, it permits the mother's entire body, and the fetus is permitted as a consequence of being part of her body.
- Model B: The Location Model (Tzav'ar Ha-Em). Under this model, the fetus is an independent entity. However, the Torah establishes that the mother's neck serves as the legal proxy for the fetus's neck (צוואר האם כצוואר העובר דמי). The act of shechitah on the mother's neck physically occurs on her, but its legal effect is applied directly to the fetus.
This conceptual split helps resolve Rav Hoshaya's dilemma on Chullin 74a:11:
"בעי רב הושעיא: הכניס ידו למעי בהמה ושחט בה בן תשעה חי, מהו?" (Rav Hoshaya raised a dilemma: If one inserted his hand inside the womb and slaughtered a nine-month-old fetus, what is the law?)
If we follow Model A (The Identity Model), slaughtering the fetus directly inside the womb should be ineffective. You cannot perform shechitah on a single organ of a living animal while it is still inside. The only way to permit the fetus is to slaughter the mother's neck, which permits her entire body.
If we follow Model B (The Location Model), slaughtering the fetus directly inside the womb should be effective. If the mother's neck is merely a proxy for the fetus's neck, then slaughtering the fetus's actual neck must be at least as effective as slaughtering the proxy. The Gemara's discussion of whether "the Merciful One considers four simanim to be fit" (ארבעה סימנים אכשיר ביה רחמנא) suggests that the Torah permits slaughtering either the mother's two simanim (windpipe and gullet) or the fetus's two simanim to permit the fetus.
Friction
The Conflict: Rabbi Yoḥanan's Contradiction on Fetal Independence
On Chullin 74a:15, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Resh Lakish argue about whether a fetus inside a slaughtered mother can contract a different degree of impurity than the mother:
"רבי יוחנן אמר: מונין ראשון ושני. וריש לקיש אמר: אין מונין ראשון ושני."
- Resh Lakish holds that they are considered a single entity (כאגוז בקליפתו דמי - like a nut in its shell). If the mother touches a source of impurity, both she and the fetus contract first-degree impurity (rishon l'tumah).
- Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that they are two separate entities. Therefore, if the mother touches a source of impurity, she becomes a rishon, and the fetus contracts second-degree impurity (sheni l'tumah) through its contact with her.
This presents a major conceptual difficulty. If Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the mother and fetus are two separate entities, how does the mother's slaughter permit the fetus? The entire mechanism of shechitat em relies on the fetus being part of the mother's body (ubbar yerech imo). If they are separate entities, the mother's slaughter should have no effect on the fetus, and the fetus should require its own slaughter.
Furthermore, if they are separate entities, why does Rabbi Yoḥanan agree that the fetus is purified from the impurity of a carcass (tumat nevelah) by the mother's slaughter?
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Rabbi Yoḥanan's Contradiction │
└────────────────┬────────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Rule of Shechitat Em │ │ Rule of Tumat Tumah │
├─────────────────────────────────┤ ├─────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Mother's shechitah permits │ │ • Mother and fetus are two │
│ the fetus. │ │ separate entities. │
│ • Requires "one entity" model │ │ • Requires "two entities" model │
│ (ubbar yerech imo). │ │ (mo'nin rishon v'sheni). │
└─────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────────────┘
Resolution 1: The Ritva's Distinction Between Spatial and Legal Attachment
The Ritva [^2] resolves this contradiction by distinguishing between physical-spatial containment and legal-biological identity.
Regarding the laws of ritual impurity (tumah), the Torah's rules of contact (nega) are governed by physical boundaries. Because the fetus is enclosed in its own amniotic sac (shilya) and has its own skin, it occupies a separate physical space from the mother. Therefore, they are treated as two separate entities for the transmission of impurity. Impurity cannot pass from the mother to the fetus as if they were a single continuous piece of meat; instead, it must travel from the mother (the rishon) to the fetus (which becomes a sheni).
Regarding the laws of food permissibility (heter akhilah), the fetus's life is entirely dependent on the mother's life-force. It does not breathe its own air or eat its own food. Because its life is legally tied to the mother, the termination of her life-force via shechitah also serves as the halakhic termination of the fetus's life-force. Thus, the mother's slaughter permits the fetus, even though they are treated as physically separate entities for the laws of impurity.
Resolution 2: Rav Chaim Soloveitchik's Dual Mechanisms of Shechitah
Rav Chaim Soloveitchik [^3] offers a different resolution by dividing shechitah into two distinct legal mechanisms:
- Chachalot Issur v'Heter: The removal of the prohibition of eiver min ha-chai (limb from a living animal) and the establishment of the meat as permitted for consumption.
- Hekhsher לקבל טומאה: The physical process that renders the meat susceptible to contracting impurity through contact with liquids, based on the verse "כי יותן מים על זרע" Leviticus 11:38.
Rav Chaim argues that the permit of the fetus does not require it to be physically part of the mother's body. The Torah established a rule that the mother's slaughter is the valid halakhic mechanism to permit the fetus's meat.
However, susceptibility to impurity (hekhsher tumah) is a physical process that requires liquid to touch the meat directly. The blood of the mother's slaughter on her neck does not physically touch the fetus inside the womb. Because the fetus is physically separated by its amniotic sac, the mother's blood cannot make the fetus susceptible to impurity unless they are treated as a single physical entity.
Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the fetus and mother are physically separate. Therefore, the mother's blood does not render the fetus susceptible to impurity. However, the fetus is still permitted by the mother's slaughter because that permit is a metaphysical rule of shechitah, not a physical process that requires physical contact.
Intertext
To understand the broader context of these principles, we must examine how they are applied in other areas of halakha, specifically in the laws of redeeming a firstborn donkey (peter chamor) and the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch.
1. Bekhorot 12a: The Definition of a "Lamb" (Seh)
The Gemara on Chullin 74a:14 raises a dilemma regarding whether a ben pekua can be used to redeem a firstborn donkey:
"מיבעי בעי מיניה: מהו לפדות בבן פקועה?"
This dilemma is directly connected to the discussion in Bekhorot 12a regarding what qualifies as a "lamb" (seh) under Exodus 13:13:
"ופטר חמור תפדה בשה"
The Gemara in Bekhorot establishes that the term seh includes sheep and goats of any age or gender, and even those with physical blemishes. However, Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi debate whether a ben pekua is included Chullin 74a:14:
Mar Zutra holds that you cannot redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua. He derives this through a verbal analogy (gezerah shavah) using the word seh from the Paschal offering Exodus 12:5:
"שה תמים זכר בן שנה יהיה לכם"
Just as the Paschal lamb must be an animal that is fit for the altar, the lamb used for redeeming a firstborn donkey must be fit for the altar. A ben pekua is unfit for the altar because it is legally considered "slaughtered" by its mother's shechitah; you cannot sacrifice an animal that has already been slaughtered.
Rav Ashi holds that you can redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua. He argues that the Torah repeats the phrase "you shall redeem... you shall redeem" (תפדה... ולא תפדה) to expand the category of valid lambs. This expansion includes even a ben pekua, because physically it is a living lamb running in the field, even if it is legally considered "meat" regarding other laws.
This debate highlights a fundamental question: When the Torah uses a physical term like "lamb" (seh), does it refer to the biological reality of the animal (a living, breathing sheep) or to its halakhic status (an animal that is subject to living laws and fit for the altar)?
┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ What is a "Lamb" (Seh) │
│ under Exodus 13:13? │
└──────────────┬───────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Biological Reality │ │ Halakhic Status │
├─────────────────────────────────┤ ├─────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Defined by physical form. │ │ • Defined by ritual fitness. │
│ • A living, breathing sheep. │ │ • Must be fit for the altar. │
│ • Includes a ben pekua. │ │ • Excludes a ben pekua (since │
│ • (Rav Ashi's view) │ │ it is legally "slaughtered"). │
│ │ │ • (Mar Zutra's view) │
└─────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────────────┘
2. Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 13: The Permissibility of Fetal Fat and Blood
In Yoreh Deah 13, the Shulchan Aruch codifies the practical rulings derived from our sugya:
"בן פקועה... אינו טעון שחיטה ואפילו גדל כמה שנים... ומותר בחלבו ודמו" [^4] (A ben pekua... does not require slaughter, even if it grew for several years... and its fat and blood are permitted.)
However, the Rama adds a significant qualification:
"ויש אומרים דאף על פי שמן התורה מותר בלא שחיטה, מכל מקום כבר נהגו כל ישראל לשחטו... ואין לשנות" [^5] (And some say that even though it is biblically permitted without slaughter, nevertheless, all of Israel has adopted the custom to slaughter it... and one should not change this.)
The Rama's ruling shows how the codifiers managed the tension between biblical law and public perception. Biblically, a ben pekua is "slaughtered meat" and does not require shechitah. However, because it looks like a living animal, eating it without shechitah would look like a violation of the prohibition against eating meat from a living animal or an unslaughtered carcass (nevelah). To avoid this appearance of wrongdoing (mar'it ayin), the custom arose to require shechitah for any ben pekua that is born alive and allowed to grow.
Psak / Practice
The halakhic consensus regarding the ben pekua and its practical application today is structured around three key rulings:
1. The Requirement of Slaughter (Shechitah)
By biblical law, a ben pekua does not require slaughter, even if it is five years old and plowing in the field, as ruled by Rabbi Shimon Shezuri Chullin 74a:12. However, the Shulchan Aruch and the Rama rule that we require shechitah before eating it to avoid mar'it ayin [^6].
If one eats a ben pekua without shechitah today, they do not violate the biblical prohibition of nevelah, but they violate the rabbinic decree and go against established Jewish custom (minhag).
2. The Status of its Offspring (Vlad Ben Pekua)
If a female ben pekua mates with a standard male animal, what is the status of the offspring? This is a major discussion in the commentators on the Shulchan Aruch [^7].
- The Father's Side (Tzad Ha-Av): The father is a standard animal whose slaughter is required to permit his offspring.
- The Mother's Side (Tzad Ha-Em): The mother is a ben pekua whose offspring might be permitted by her own original "slaughter" (the slaughter of her mother).
Because the offspring is produced by both parents (zeh v'zeh garem), the Shulchan Aruch rules stringently. The offspring requires its own shechitah because of the father's side. Furthermore, its fat (chelev) and blood (dam) are forbidden, unlike those of its mother, because the father's contribution brings the offspring back into the category of standard living animals.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Offspring of a Female Ben Pekua │
│ and a Standard Male │
└────────────────────┬────────────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Mother (Ben Pekua) │ │ Father (Standard) │
├─────────────────────────────────┤ ├─────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Legally "slaughtered" meat. │ │ • Standard living animal. │
│ • Fat and blood are permitted. │ │ • Requires shechitah. │
│ │ │ • Fat and blood are forbidden. │
└─────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Resulting Offspring │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Rules stringently (zeh v'zeh garem). │
│ • Requires its own shechitah. │
│ • Fat and blood are forbidden. │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
3. The Meta-Psak Heuristic: "Fiction" vs. "Reality"
This sugya highlights an important principle in halakhic decision-making: the distinction between halakhic categories and physical reality.
Halakha can define an object in a way that contradicts its physical appearance. A ben pekua is physically alive, running, and growing, but halakhically it is "slaughtered meat."
When physical reality and halakhic definitions clash, halakha often uses Rabbinic decrees (like mar'it ayin) to bridge the gap. This ensures that the public, who see only the physical reality, does not mistake a rare halakhic permit for a general license to violate the law.
Takeaway
The sugya on Chullin 74a teaches that physical boundaries do not always align with halakhic identities; an animal can be physically alive yet halakhically slaughtered, demonstrating the power of shechitah to redefine the metaphysical status of a cheftza.
[^1]: Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim HaLevi on Hilkhot Shechitah 1:14. [^2]: Ritva on Chullin 74a:15, s.v. Rabbi Yoḥanan amar. [^3]: Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim HaLevi on Hilkhot Shechitah 1:14, s.v. U've'inyan hekhsher tumah. [^4]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 13:4. [^5]: Rama on Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 13:4. [^6]: Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Yoreh Deah 13:4. [^7]: See Shach and Taz on Yoreh Deah 13:4.
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