Chullin 85

Sugya Map

• Issue: Does a non-viable shechita (an act of slaughter that does not permit the meat for consumption, e.g., a tereifa) constitute a halakhic "slaughter" regarding the obligation to cover blood Leviticus 17:13 and the prohibition of "it and its offspring" Leviticus 22:28?
• The Machloket: Rabbi Meir holds that even non-viable slaughter is considered "slaughter" (shechita), while the Sages/Rabbi Shimon hold it is not.
• Nafka Mina:
  • Liability for slaughtering a tereifa on a festival.
  • Obligation to cover blood for non-kosher birds.
  • Liability for slaughtering a tereifa "it and its offspring."
• Primary Sources: Chullin 85a, Leviticus 17, Leviticus 22, Deuteronomy 12.

Text Snapshot

The Gemara Chullin 85a interrogates the scope of shechita: "Rabbi Meir says: One is obligated to cover their blood... and the Rabbis deem one exempt." The core tension lies in the definition of shechita. The Gemara Chullin 85a citing Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi employs a gezerah shavah (verbal analogy): "just as there, with regard to one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple... it is a case of shechita that is not fit... yet it is considered shechita... so too here." Leshon nuance: The use of shechita as a taxonomic category vs. a functional, permission-granting act.

Readings

The Ritva’s Analytic Lens

The Ritva (on Chullin 85a) raises a sharp kushya: If the gezerah shavah from shochutei chutz (sacrificial slaughter outside the Temple) forces us to define non-viable slaughter as "slaughter," why does Rabbi Meir not suffer a logical collapse in the case of it and its offspring? The Ritva notes that it and its offspring is a prohibition fundamentally tied to the act of slaughtering. If the slaughter is "not fit" (i.e., it doesn't permit the animal), it effectively voids the status of the act. The Ritva resolves this by arguing that because the Torah explicitly links the two via a gezerah shavah, we accept the "bad" shechita as a shechita regardless of its functional failure, dismissing the claim that "one cannot learn a possible case from an impossible one."

The Dor Revi’i’s Meta-Analysis

The Dor Revi'i provides a brilliant meta-psak perspective. He argues that the divergent rulings of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (who flips between Meir and the Sages depending on the context) reveal that there is no monolithic definition of "slaughter" in the Mishna. Instead, the redactor is navigating a deeper ontological divide:

1. Rabbi Meir (following Rabbi Yishmael): Views shechita as a technical act of killing that, when performed on the simanim (windpipe/gullet), constitutes the definition of the act, regardless of the end result.
2. Rabbi Shimon (following Rabbi Akiva): Views shechita as a mitzvah—a transformative act that permits the forbidden. If the animal is tereifa and cannot be permitted, the act is essentially "null" and reverts to the status of neveilah (carrion).

Friction

The Strongest Kushya: If Rabbi Meir posits that ineffective shechita is still shechita, why does he not apply this universally? Specifically, if slaughtering a tereifa is "slaughter," why doesn't it permit the fetus inside (ben pekua)?

The Terutz: Rabbi Abba (cited on Chullin 85a) clarifies: Even Rabbi Meir concedes that shechita only functions as a permitter when the object is inherently susceptible to being permitted. A tereifa is ontologically barred from being permitted. Thus, the "slaughter" is a technical reality (for the purpose of the prohibition of it and its offspring), but lacks the power to nullify the issur of the animal's state. As the Gemara notes, even Rabbi Shimon admits the act removes the animal from the status of neveilah (carrion) for ritual impurity purposes—proving that "slaughter" is a spectrum of effects, not a binary state.

Intertext

• Leviticus 17:13: The verse "and he shall pour out its blood" is the locus for the mitzvah of covering blood. The friction here is whether "that may be eaten" in the verse is a limiting clause. Rabbi Meir treats it as a mere description of the common case (davar ha-metzuyah), while the Sages view it as an exclusionary clause (mi'ut).
• Temurah 33b: The discussion of non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard reinforces the Rabbinic fear of "looking like the forbidden." This provides the safek (uncertainty) logic that plagues the koy (hybrid animal) in our sugya; we treat the safek with the stringency of the likely-obligated status.

Psak/Practice

In modern halakhic practice, this sugya informs the heuristic of shechita as a "formal act" vs. a "result-oriented act." The psak follows the Sages: we do not cover blood for a tereifa because the slaughter is viewed as functionally absent SA YD 28:1. The koy remains a classic case of safek where, due to the inability to resolve the taxonomy, we default to stringency regarding the mitzvah of covering blood, effectively treating the "slaughter" as valid for the mitzvah despite its questionable status for consumption.

Takeaway

Shechita is not merely an act of killing; it is a legal category. To Rabbi Meir, it is a mechanical act defined by the simanim; to the Sages, it is a teleological act defined by its capacity to permit.