Daf Yomi
Chullin 85
In another voice
Sugya Map
The sugya on Chullin 85a serves as the conceptual crucible for defining the legal boundaries of shechitah (ritual slaughter). The central tension animating the discussion is whether an act of slaughter that is halakhically ineffective—meaning it fails to render the animal permissible for consumption (shechitah she'eina re'uyah)—can still be formally categorized as an act of shechitah regarding other areas of Torah law.
[Shechitah She'eina Re'uyah]
|
+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| |
[Formalist View] [Functionalist View]
(Rabbi Meir) (Rabbi Shimon)
| |
"Shemah Shechitah" "Lav Shemah Shechitah"
| |
- Oto Ve'et Beno: Liable - Oto Ve'et Beno: Exempt
- Kisuy HaDam: Obligated - Kisuy HaDam: Exempt
- Toveach U'machar: Liable - Toveach U'machar: Exempt
This fundamental inquiry yields several practical and conceptual nafka minot (halakhic ramifications):
- Oto Ve'et Beno (The prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day under Leviticus 22:28): If one performs an invalid or ineffective slaughter (e.g., slaughtering a tereifah, an animal with a terminal organic defect) on the mother, does a subsequent valid slaughter of the offspring on that same day violate the negative commandment?
- Kisuy HaDam (The obligation to cover the blood of a slaughtered wild animal or bird under Leviticus 17:13): Does the blood of a tereifah animal, which is forbidden to be eaten, require covering?
- Toveach U'machar (The four- or five-fold financial penalty imposed on a thief who slaughters or sells a stolen sheep or ox under Exodus 21:37): If the thief slaughters the stolen animal in an ineffective manner (such as finding it to be a tereifah), does he pay the penalty?
- Taharat Nevelah (Purification from carcass impurity under Leviticus 11:39): Does an ineffective slaughter performed on a tereifah animal succeed in rescuing it from imparting the severe ritual impurity of nevelah (carcass)?
Primary Sources
The foundational texts mapped out in this sugya include:
- Mishnah Chullin 5:3 (governing Oto Ve'et Beno).
- Mishnah Chullin 6:2 (governing Kisuy HaDam).
- Chullin 85a-85b (the Talmudic analysis of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s editorial decisions).
- Genesis 43:16 and Leviticus 17:3-4 (the exegetical anchors for the opposing Tannaitic paradigms).
Listen to this lesson. Ask it questions.
Audio, a chevruta that cites its sources, Hebrew tools, and every daily cycle, in the app.
Text Snapshot
The Gemara on Chullin 85a records a fascinating editorial phenomenon wherein Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Rabbi) appears to adopt conflicting positions across different tractates:
"אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן: ראה רבי דברי רבי מאיר באותו ואת בנו, ושנאו בלשון חכמים; ודברי רבי שמעון בכיסוי הדם, ושנאו בלשון חכמים."
“Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yochanan said: Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi] saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Meir with regard to [the prohibition of] a mother and its offspring, and taught it [anonymously] in the Mishnah using the term ‘the Sages’ [to ensure its acceptance]. And he saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon with regard to the mitzvah of covering the blood, and taught it in the Mishnah using the term ‘the Sages’.”[^1]
Philological and Textual Nuances
To understand the mechanics of the Gemara's derivations, we must analyze the linguistic clash between two biblical roots: שחט (shachat - to slaughter) and טבח (tavach - to butcher/slaughter).
[Leviticus 17:3] "אשר ישחט" (Shechutei Chutz)
\
--> [Leviticus 22:28] "לא תשחטו" (Oto Ve'et Beno) ==> [שחט] (Formal Act)
/
[Genesis 43:16] "וטבוח טבח" (Yosef's Feast)
\
--> [Exodus 21:37] "וטיבחו" (Toveach U'machar) ==> [טבח] (Functional Preparation)
The school of Rabbi Yishmael asserts that we can build a gezerah shavah (verbal analogy) between disparate roots if no identical terms are available, citing the leprosy verses: "ושב" (ve-shav - and he shall return, Leviticus 14:39) and "ובא" (ve-va - and he shall come, Leviticus 14:44).
However, where identical terms are available, we must use them. Rabbi Meir utilizes the root שחט in the context of Oto Ve'et Beno ("לא תשחטו" under Leviticus 22:28) and links it via gezerah shavah to shechutei chutz (slaughtering consecrated offerings outside the Temple courtyard, "אשר ישחט" under Leviticus 17:3). In shechutei chutz, the act is a severe sin and the meat is forbidden; yet the Torah explicitly calls it "slaughter" (shechitah). Thus, Rabbi Meir establishes that Shechitah She'eina Re'uyah Shemah Shechitah (unfit slaughter is legally termed slaughter).
Conversely, Rabbi Shimon anchors his view in the root טבח. He points to Yosef’s instruction to his steward: "וטבוח טבח והכן" ("Slaughter meat and prepare," Genesis 43:16). Here, the term teviha is intrinsically tied to preparation for consumption ("for the men shall dine with me at noon"). Rabbi Shimon argues that just as teviha must yield food fit for consumption, so too must any legal category of shechitah yield food fit for consumption to be halakhically recognized as "slaughter."
[^1]: Chullin 85a:9.
Readings
The Rishonim and Acharonim grapple with the deep conceptual, teleological, and structural difficulties presented by this sugya. Why would Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi split his rulings, and what is the underlying nature of shechitah?
=============================================================================================
Authority Conceptual Model Core Chiddush
=============================================================================================
Rashi Teleological-Linguistic "Teviha" is intrinsically culinary;
Identity slaughter without consumption is a
contradiction in terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ritva Hermeneutical Absolutism Gezerah Shavah from Shechutei Chutz
transcends logical asymmetries like
"efshar mishai efshar."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dor Revi'i Historical-Theological The dispute is rooted in Wilderness
(Basar Ta'avah) history; Rabbi Meir views shechitah
as a ritual, R' Shimon as a permit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chiddushei R' Chaim Ontological Dualism Shechitah is split into "Ma'aseh"
(Ma'aseh vs. Chalut) (the physical act) and "Matir"
(the permissive result).
=============================================================================================
1. Rashi: The Teleological Definition of Slaughter
Rashi, commenting on the Gemara’s derivation from Yosef’s instructions, writes:
"מה להלן שחיטה ראויה - כדכתיב כי אתי יאכלו."
“Just as there, it is a fit slaughter—as it is written: ‘for they shall eat with me’.”[^2]
Rashi’s formulation is brief but conceptually profound. For Rabbi Shimon, the very definition of shechitah is not mechanical, but teleological. A physical act of cutting the trachea and esophagus (simanim) is not an isolated halakhic event; it is the introductory phase of human consumption. If the animal is a tereifah, rendering it a priori forbidden to be eaten, the physical act of cutting the neck is stripped of its teleological destination. It is no longer an act of "preparation" (hakhsharah); it is a meaningless act of killing.
Rashi emphasizes that the word "וטבוח" (ve-tavo'ach) is syntactically and conceptually bound to "והכן" (ve-hachen - and prepare). Preparation requires a usable end-product. Without the capacity for consumption, the linguistic and legal category of shechitah collapses.
2. Ritva: The Limits of Comparison (Efshar Mishai Efshar)
The Ritva addresses a powerful methodological challenge to Rabbi Meir’s gezerah shavah from shechutei chutz:
"גמ' מאי טעמא דר"י באותו ואת בנו גמר משחוטי חוץ... איכא למידק מה לשחוטי חוץ דאי אפשר לעולם בשחיטה ראויה... וי"ל דאפ"ה כיון דבגז"ש גמיר לה שפיר גמרינן מינה ואין אומרים בזה שאין למדין אפשר משאי אפשר דסוף סוף הא קריא רחמנא שחיטה..."
“The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Meir in ‘Oto Ve’et Beno’? He derives it from ‘shechutei chutz’... One can object: what is unique about ‘shechutei chutz’ is that it can never be a fit slaughter [as slaughtering outside the Temple is inherently forbidden]... And one can answer that even so, since he derives it via a verbal analogy, we indeed derive it, and we do not apply the rule that we cannot derive that which is possible [efshar, i.e., Oto Ve'et Beno, which could be done with a fit animal] from that which is impossible [shai efshar, i.e., shechutei chutz, which is always forbidden]. For ultimately, the Torah calls it ‘slaughter’.”[^3]
The Ritva introduces a critical rule of hermeneutics. Normally, we cannot derive a halakhah for a scenario that can occur in a permitted manner (efshar) from a scenario that cannot ever occur in a permitted manner (אי אפשר). By definition, any animal slaughtered as shechutei chutz is forbidden for benefit. Therefore, shechutei chutz is inherently an unfit slaughter. How can Rabbi Meir use it as the archetype to prove that shechitah she'eina re'uyah is called shechitah in Oto Ve'et Beno, where the slaughter could have been performed fitly?
The Ritva’s chiddush (novel insight) is that the formal power of a gezerah shavah overrides this logical asymmetry. When the Torah uses the word "שחיטה" in both contexts, it is not merely suggesting a logical comparison; it is establishing a linguistic identity. If the Torah chooses to call the forbidden, non-culinary act of shechutei chutz by the name "שחיטה," it means that the objective definition of the word shechitah in the divine lexicon is independent of its practical outcome.
3. Dor Revi'i: The Historical-Theological Roots of the Dispute
Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner, in his Dor Revi'i, offers a brilliant, highly original perspective that unifies the Tannaitic dispute by linking it to the historical status of meat in the Wilderness.^4
[The Wilderness Era]
|
+------------------------+------------------------+
| |
[R' Yishmael / R' Meir] [R' Akiva / R' Shimon]
| |
- Basar Ta'avah Forbidden - Basar Ta'avah Permitted
- Shechitah = Sacrificial Ritual - Shechitah = Practical Permit
- Objective "Ma'aseh" - Functional "Hakhsharah"
The Gemara in Chullin 16b records a dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva regarding basar ta'avah (meat of desire/non-sacred meat) in the Wilderness.
- Rabbi Yishmael holds that non-sacred meat was completely forbidden in the wilderness; the only way to eat meat was to bring it as a peace-offering (shelamim) to the Tabernacle. Thus, the concept of shechitah was originally entirely sacrificial.
- Rabbi Akiva holds that non-sacred meat was permitted in the wilderness without shechitah (they could eat stabbed meat, basar nechirah), and the commandment of shechitah was only introduced upon entry into the Land of Israel as a specific permit to eat meat.
The Dor Revi'i argues that Rabbi Meir (who aligns with Rabbi Yishmael) and Rabbi Shimon (who aligns with Rabbi Akiva) carry this dispute directly into our sugya:
- According to Rabbi Meir (R' Yishmael), shechitah was originally a sacrificial ritual, not a mere pragmatic tool to permit meat. A ritual has an objective, formal definition. Just as a sacrificial act of slaughter is legally recognized even if it is disqualified, so too any shechitah is objectively defined by the formal act, regardless of whether it permits the food.
- According to Rabbi Shimon (R' Akiva), shechitah was introduced solely as a practical mechanism to permit the animal for consumption. Therefore, the very definition of shechitah is "that which permits." If the animal is a tereifah, the slaughter cannot permit it, and it therefore fails to meet the basic definition of shechitah.
With this, the Dor Revi'i explains why Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi split his rulings. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not suffer from intellectual inconsistency. Rather, he recognized that the Torah's laws are multi-dimensional:
- Regarding Oto Ve'et Beno, which is a prohibition focused on the cruelty of the act of slaughtering parent and child on the same day, the Torah cares about the formal, objective act of slaughter. Thus, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled like Rabbi Meir that even an unfit slaughter is prohibited.
- Regarding Kisuy HaDam, which is a mitzvah linked to the consumption of the animal ("אשר יצוד... אשר יאכל" - that which is hunted... that which is eaten), the obligation is conceptually bound to the food-preparation process. Thus, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled like Rabbi Shimon that an unfit slaughter is exempt.
4. Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim: The Ontological Dualism of Shechitah
Rav Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk provides the classic analytical framework for this sugya, distinguishing between the Ma'aseh (the physical action) of shechitah and the Matir/Chalut (the metaphysical permit/status change) of shechitah.
Rav Chaim asks: When Rabbi Shimon says Shechitah She'eina Re'uyah Lav Shemah Shechitah, does he mean that the act is physically not considered shechitah, or does he mean that it lacks the halakhic potency of shechitah?
Rav Chaim demonstrates that there are two distinct dimensions:
- The Gavra's Act (Ma'aseh Shechitah): The physical cutting of the simanim by a human being. This is a purely mechanical definition.
- The Cheftza's Status Change (Chalut Hakhsharah): The metaphysical transition of the animal from a live being (eiver min ha-chai) to a permitted food item.
In the case of a tereifah, the Ma'aseh Shechitah is fully executed. However, the Chalut Hakhsharah cannot occur because the animal is inherently forbidden due to its organic defect.
- Rabbi Meir holds that most prohibitions and obligations in the Torah (such as Oto Ve'et Beno and Kisuy HaDam) are triggered by the Ma'aseh Shechitah. Since the physical act was performed, the laws apply.
- Rabbi Shimon holds that these laws are triggered by the Chalut Hakhsharah. Since the animal never transitioned into a state of permissible food, no halakhic "slaughter" has occurred in the eyes of the law.
[^2]: Rashi on Chullin 85a:12:1. [^3]: Ritva on Chullin 85a:3. [^4]: Dor Revi'i on Chullin 85a:2:1-2.
Friction
The Kushya: The Paradox of Taharat Nevelah
The most formidable kushya (difficulty) on Rabbi Shimon's position emerges from his own concession regarding taharat nevelah (purification from carcass impurity).
The Gemara on Chullin 85a states:
"ולא לכל אמר רבי שמעון שחיטה שאינה ראויה לאו שמה שחיטה, שהרי מודה רבי שמעון שהיא מטהרתה מידי נבלתה."
“And not with regard to all laws did Rabbi Shimon say that an unfit slaughter is not considered slaughter, as Rabbi Shimon concedes that it [the unfit slaughter of a tereifah] renders the animal pure from having the impure status of an unslaughtered animal carcass.”[^5]
This is a glaring conceptual paradox: If Rabbi Shimon holds that Shechitah She'eina Re'uyah Lav Shemah Shechitah—meaning that an unfit slaughter is a halakhic non-event, a mere act of stabbing or killing—why does it have the metaphysical power to purify the tereifah animal from the severe impurity of nevelah?
If it is not a "slaughter," the animal should be treated as if it died on its own (nevelah)! If the act is potent enough to alter the metaphysical status of the animal's physical meat (from impure nevelah to pure tereifah), how can Rabbi Shimon simultaneously maintain that it is "not considered slaughter" for Oto Ve'et Beno or Kisuy HaDam?
[Unfit Slaughter of a Tereifah]
|
+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| |
[Ritual Impurity Status] [Mitzvah/Prohibition]
(Taharat Nevelah) (Oto Ve'et Beno)
| |
Halakhically EFFECTIVE Halakhically INEFFECTIVE
(Animal is Pure) (Exempt/No Violation)
\ /
+----> WHY THE ONTOLOGICAL SPLIT? <-----------+
Terutz 1: The Dual Mechanism of Purification (Tosafot / Ramban)
The Tosafot and the Ramban resolve this by fundamentally redefining how shechitah interacts with ritual impurity.^6
They argue that the purification of a tereifah from nevelah is not driven by a positive chalut (metaphysical status) of shechitah. Rather, it is a negative exclusion derived from the biblical text. The Torah states regarding carcass impurity:
"וכי ימות מן הבהמה... הנוגע בנבלתה יטמא."
“And if there dies of the animals... he who touches its carcass shall be unclean.” Leviticus 11:39
The Sages expound upon the word "מן" (min - "of" or "part of"): some animals transmit impurity upon death, and some do not. This excludes a tereifah that was slaughtered.
The purification does not occur because a "kosher slaughter" has been achieved. Rather, the physical act of cutting the simanim serves as a maveit—a human-induced cause of death. Because the animal’s life was terminated via a human act of cutting, it is legally excluded from the category of "dying on its own" (וכי ימות).
Therefore, Rabbi Shimon can consistently argue:
- Regarding positive halakhic categories (Oto Ve'et Beno, Kisuy HaDam), which require a formal, positive halakhic status of shechitah, an unfit slaughter is a non-event (lav shemah shechitah).
- Regarding the laws of impurity, which merely require that the animal not die a natural death, the physical act of cutting the simanim is sufficient to prevent the animal from becoming nevelah, without needing to achieve the formal halakhic status of shechitah.
Terutz 2: The Brisker Conceptualization of "Tahat Ha-Simanim"
Rav Chaim Soloveitchik (and later elaborated by the Chazon Ish) offers a deeper, ontological refinement of this distinction.
Rav Chaim explains that there are two distinct legal results of cutting the simanim:
- Hakhsharah (Permitting): Rendering the meat permissible for consumption by removing the prohibition of eiver min ha-chai (limb from the living).
- Mithah (Killing): Defining the biological and halakhic transition from life to death.
When an animal is slaughtered, the cutting of the simanim performs a double function: it kills the animal, and it permits the animal.
In a tereifah, the "permitting" function is blocked because the animal is already forbidden due to its terminal illness. However, the "killing" function is fully operational. The animal died through the formal process of shechitah (cutting the simanim), rather than through organic collapse.
Therefore, Rabbi Shimon holds that:
- Where the Torah requires the permitting aspect of slaughter (such as Kisuy HaDam, which is only obligated on animals "that may be eaten"), an unfit slaughter is not considered shechitah.
- Where the Torah merely requires that the death of the animal be executed via the formal mechanism of cutting the simanim to avoid the status of natural death (nevelah), the "killing" aspect of the shechitah is fully effective. The animal has been "slaughtered to death," which is ontologically distinct from "dying to death."
[^5]: Chullin 85a:8. [^6]: Tosafot on Chullin 85a:8 s.v. שהרי מודה ר"ש; Ramban, Chullin ad loc.
Intertext
To fully appreciate the reach of this conceptual model, we must examine how the debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon manifests in other areas of the Halakhic corpus.
1. The Parallel: Chulin Ba-Azarah (Non-Sacred Slaughter in the Temple)
A powerful parallel to our sugya is found in Mishnah Temurah 7:4 and the Gemara in Temurah 33b. The Torah prohibits the slaughter of non-sacred animals (chulin) inside the Temple courtyard (azarah). If one slaughters a non-sacred tereifah animal inside the Temple courtyard, has he violated this prohibition?
[Slaughtering Chulin in the Azarah]
|
+----------------------+----------------------+
| |
[Rabbi Meir] [Rabbi Shimon]
| |
- "Shemah Shechitah" - "Lav Shemah Shechitah"
- Transgression occurs - No Transgression
- Meat must be burned - Meat is exempt from burning
- According to Rabbi Meir, who holds Shechitah She'eina Re'uyah Shemah Shechitah, this act is legally considered a "slaughter." Consequently, the individual has violated the Torah prohibition of chulin ba-azarah, and the carcass must be burned.
- According to Rabbi Shimon, who holds Shechitah She'eina Re'uyah Lav Shemah Shechitah, this act is not legally considered a "slaughter." It is merely a physical killing. Therefore, the individual has not violated the Torah prohibition of chulin ba-azarah (though there may be a rabbinic prohibition), and the meat is exempt from the requirement of burning.
This parallel demonstrates that the dispute is not a localized argument about Oto Ve'et Beno or Kisuy HaDam, but a systematic debate over the definition of the word shechitah across the entire Torah.
2. Codification in the Shulchan Aruch
The practical Halakha, as codified by Rabbi Yosef Karo (the Mechaber) and Rabbi Moshe Isserles (the Rama), reflects the fascinating split-decision of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
Oto Ve'et Beno (Stringent - Rabbi Meir)
In Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 16:2, the Mechaber rules:
"השוחט שחיטה שאינה ראויה... כגון ששחט ונמצאת טרפה... חשיבא שחיטה לענין אותו ואת בנו ואסור לשחוט השני ביום אחד."
“One who performs an unfit slaughter... for example, he slaughtered and it was found to be a tereifah... it is considered a valid slaughter regarding the prohibition of Oto Ve'et Beno, and it is forbidden to slaughter the second animal on that same day.”
Kisuy HaDam (Lenient - Rabbi Shimon)
Conversely, in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 28:8, the Mechaber rules:
"השוחט ונמצאת טרפה... פטור מלכסות."
“One who slaughters and the animal is found to be a tereifah... is exempt from covering the blood.”
The Halakha adopts the stringent ruling of Rabbi Meir for the prohibition of Oto Ve'et Beno (ruling that the unfit slaughter is legally significant, thereby forbidding the second slaughter), while adopting the lenient ruling of Rabbi Shimon for the mitzvah of Kisuy HaDam (ruling that the unfit slaughter is not legally significant, thereby exempting the blood from being covered).
Psak/Practice
The Meta-Psak Heuristic: "Zacha Shetrei Le-Vei Trei"
The split decision codified in the Shulchan Aruch presents a major challenge to systematic legal philosophy. How can a single legal system adopt two contradictory definitions of the exact same term (shechitah) in the same code of law?
The Gemara itself acknowledges this structural tension through the voice of Rabbi Yochanan, who explains that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi edited the Mishnah by choosing the most compelling logical argument for each specific case:
"ראה רבי דברי רבי מאיר באותו ואת בנו... ודברי רבי שמעון בכיסוי הדם..."[^7]
In the realms of post-Talmudic authority, this is often explained through the lens of Safek De-oraita Le-chumra (the rule of resolving Torah-level doubts stringently). Because the underlying nature of Shechitah She'eina Re'uyah remains an unresolved conceptual doubt, we must rule stringently in both directions:
[The Nature of Shechitah She'eina Re'uyah]
|
[Unresolved Safek]
|
+----------------------------+----------------------------+
| |
[Oto Ve'et Beno] [Kisuy HaDam]
(Negative Prohibition) (Positive Mitzvah)
| |
Rule STRINGENTLY Rule LENIENTLY
(Assume it IS shechitah) (Assume it is NOT shechitah)
| |
Forbidden to slaughter second Exempt from covering blood
- In Oto Ve'et Beno (a negative prohibition carrying the penalty of lashes), we must be stringent. We assume like Rabbi Meir that the unfit slaughter is considered a slaughter, and we therefore forbid slaughtering the second animal on that day.
- In Kisuy HaDam (a positive commandment requiring a blessing), we cannot require the covering with a blessing because of the rule Safek Berakhot Le-hakel (we do not recite blessings in cases of doubt). Furthermore, since the Torah links the mitzvah of covering to "eating," we follow Rabbi Shimon's logic that an animal that cannot be eaten does not require its blood to be covered.
Practical Halakhic Applications Today
1. Checking for Tereifot before Kisuy HaDam
In modern kosher slaughterhouses, if a wild animal (such as a deer) or a bird is slaughtered, the lungs and other vital organs must be checked for tereifah status before the blessing for Kisuy HaDam is recited.
If the animal is found to be a tereifah, no blessing is recited, and the blood is not covered (or it is covered without a blessing, depending on local custom), in accordance with Rabbi Shimon's ruling.
2. The Case of a Doubtful Tereifah (Safek Tereifah)
If an animal is slaughtered and there is a unresolved doubt as to whether it is a tereifah:
- Regarding Oto Ve'et Beno, one must wait until the following day to slaughter the offspring, due to the double doubt (safek) of whether the first slaughter was valid and whether the first animal was indeed a tereifah.
- Regarding Kisuy HaDam, one covers the blood without reciting the blessing, navigating the conflict between the obligation to cover and the prohibition of reciting a vain blessing (berakha le-vatalah).
[^7]: Chullin 85a:9.
Takeaway
The debate over Shechitah She'eina Re'uyah reveals that a halakhic act is not merely a physical event, but a conceptual reality defined by its context: it can be viewed either as a formal, objective human action or as a functional, goal-oriented process of preparation. Halakha masterfully balances these two views, applying the formalist view to guard against cruelty in prohibitions, while reserving the functionalist view for the positive mitzvot of consumption.
Read this page at another depth
Tomorrow's lesson, already explained.
Today's is done. Tomorrow morning's arrives the same way: one short, source-cited email on the day's page. Every day of the cycle has one.
derekhlearning.com