Menachot 57

Sugya Map

This sugya on Menachot 57a-b navigates several intricate halachic concepts, primarily focusing on the definition of melachot on Shabbat and the scope of issurei korbanot.

• Issue 1: Defining Tzli (Roasting) as a Melacha on Shabbat.

  • Sub-issue: What shiur (measure/extent) of roasting constitutes a chiyuv (liability)? Is it Ma'achal Ben Derosai? Does it require both sides? What if it's in multiple spots?
  • Nafka Mina(s): Practical halacha for bishul/tzli on Shabbat; understanding the shiurim for melachot.
  • Primary Sources: Menachot 57a (R' Yochanan, Rava, Ravina, Rav Ashi), Shabbat 102b (Mishna on drilling), Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 9:5.

• Issue 2: Scope of Issur Chametz in Mincha.

  • Sub-issue: Does the prohibition of chametz apply to a mincha פסולה (disqualified meal offering)? What about a mincha that was chametz, then פסולה (e.g., יוצאת – taken outside), and then re-chametz? What about chametz on the ראש המזבח (top of the altar)?
  • Nafka Mina(s): Understanding the kiddushah (sanctity) and psulim (disqualifications) of korbanot; the interplay of different issurim.
  • Primary Sources: Menachot 57a (Baraita, Rav Pappa, Rav Mari), Leviticus 2:11-12, Rambam, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:14.

• Issue 3: Defining the "Place of Sacrifice" for Ha'ala'a (Bringing Up).

  • Sub-issue: Is bringing an item to the kevesh (ramp) of the altar considered equivalent to bringing it to the mizbeach (altar) itself, for purposes of issurei ha'ala'a (prohibitions of bringing up)?
  • Nafka Mina(s): Precision in defining sacred spaces and actions; understanding derashot for extending prohibitions.
  • Primary Sources: Menachot 57b (R' Yochanan, R' Elazar), Leviticus 2:12.

Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with a core statement from Rabbi Yoḥanan regarding the melacha of roasting:

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמַּנִּיחַ בָּשָׂר עַל גַּבֵּי גֶּחָלִים בְּשַׁבָּת, הִיפַּךְ בּוֹ — חַיָּיב. לֹא הִיפַּךְ בּוֹ — פָּטוּר. ¹

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who placed meat on top of coals on Shabbat, if he subsequently turned over the meat to its other side, so that both sides were roasted, he is liable for cooking on Shabbat. But if he did not turn over the meat he is exempt, as the meat is considered cooked only if both sides were roasted.

The Gemara later clarifies this:

לָא צְרִיכָא: הֵיכָא דְּאִי לָא הִיפַּךְ בֵּיהּ — מִיתְבַּשַּׁל מִצַּד אֶחָד כְּמַאֲכַל בֶּן דְּרוֹסַאי, וְכִי הִיפַּךְ בֵּיהּ — מִיתְבַּשַּׁל מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין כְּמַאֲכַל בֶּן דְּרוֹסַאי. וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: דְּכֹל צָלִי מִצַּד אֶחָד כְּמַאֲכַל בֶּן דְּרוֹסַאי — לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא. ²

No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where if he does not turn over the meat it would cook on one side only partially, roughly one-third of the ordinary process of cooking, like the food of ben Derosai. And now that he turns it over, it cooks on both sides like the food of ben Derosai. And Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us that any meat roasted on only one side like the food of ben Derosai is nothing, i.e., this is not a violation of the prohibited labor of cooking on Shabbat.

Rava then introduces a crucial shiur:

רָבָא אָמַר: וְאִם כְּכוֹתֶבֶת אַחַת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד — חַיָּיב. ³

Rava says: And if a quantity of that meat equivalent in volume to a fig-bulk was fully roasted on one side of the meat and the roasted area was in one spot on the piece of meat, while the rest of the meat remained raw, he is liable for cooking on Shabbat.

Later, the baraita on issur chametz states:

"אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ לַה' " — לְהָבִיא אֶת הַכְּשֵׁרָה, וְלֹא אֶת הַפְּסוּלָה. מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: הַמַּחְמִיץ אֶת הַכְּשֵׁרָה — חַיָּיב, וְאֶת הַפְּסוּלָה — פָּטוּר. ⁴

"That you shall bring to the Lord," indicates that this prohibition applies only to a fit meal offering, but not to a disqualified meal offering… From here the Sages stated that one who leavens a fit meal offering is liable to receive lashes, but one who leavens a disqualified meal offering is exempt.

This leads to Rav Pappa's dilemma:

בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא: חִימְּצָהּ וְיָצָאת, וְחָזַר וְחִימְּצָהּ — מַהוּ? ⁵

Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one leavened a meal offering when it was fit, and subsequently someone removed the meal offering and it emerged from the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, and he again leavened it, what is the halakha?

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

• "הִיפַּךְ בּוֹ": The term hipach bo (turned it over) implies an active, intentional second stage of the melacha. Without it, even if Ma'achal Ben Derosai is reached on one side, it's not a complete melacha of tzli according to R' Yochanan, highlighting the gmar melacha aspect.
• "לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא": This strong phrase emphasizes that tzli on one side, even to the shiur of Ma'achal Ben Derosai, is not considered a melacha at all.
• "אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ לַה' ": This ribbui (inclusion) and mi'ut (exclusion) derasha is a classic midrash halacha, where specific phrasing limits or expands the scope of a mitzvah. Here, it limits the chametz prohibition to mincha kesherah.

Readings

Rashi (Menachot 57a)

Rashi, with his characteristic precision, illuminates the foundational concepts in our sugya. Regarding the baraita's statement that one is patur for chametz on a mincha פסולה, Rashi clarifies what constitutes פסולה: "כגון שיצאת או נטמאת" ⁶ (such as one that was taken out [of the Temple courtyard] or became ritually impure). This definition is crucial for understanding Rav Pappa's subsequent dilemma, which specifically involves mincha that יצאת.

When Rav Pappa asks about "חימצה ויצאת וחזר וחימצה" ⁷ (one who leavened it, then it was taken out, and he leavened it again), Rashi explains that "וחזר וחימצה" ⁸ means "כלומר גמר מעשה חימוצה שאפאה" (meaning, he completed the act of leavening, i.e., baked it). This implies that the issur of chametz is tied to the completion of the leavening process, which is often finalized by baking. His explanation of "מהו" ⁹ is "מי מיחייב משום מחמץ אחר מחמץ או לא" (is he liable for leavening after leavening or not?). This sets up the dilemma: Is the second act of leavening, on a mincha that is now פסולה, still considered an act of chametz on a mincha that warrants liability, given that the mincha already underwent chametz once?

Rashi's most insightful contribution to this safek comes in explaining the second side of the dilemma: "או דלמא כיון דחימצה לא מהני ליה בה פסול יוצא" ¹⁰ (or perhaps, since he already leavened it, the disqualification of yozei is ineffective with regard to it). Rashi interprets this to mean: "דלאו קדושה גמורה היא ואין בה אלא פסול חימוץ וחייב כשאר מחמץ אחר מחמץ" ¹¹ (that it is not a complete sanctity, and there is only a disqualification of leavening in it, and he is liable like other cases of leavening after leavening). This suggests that once the mincha has been chametz, its status is permanently altered in a way that psul yozei (disqualification due to leaving the courtyard) does not fully negate its connection to the issur chametz. It remains within a category where subsequent acts of chametz could still incur liability, perhaps because the psul yozei primarily affects its korban functionality but not its inherent chametz-prohibited nature once that process has begun.

Rambam (Hilchot Shabbat 9:5, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:14)

The Rambam provides a clear psak that incorporates the sugya's discussions into halacha l'ma'aseh. In Hilchot Shabbat, he addresses the shiur for tzli:

הצולה בשבת... חייב. ושיעור בישול וצליה שחייבין עליהן בשבת, כשיצלה כל צרכו. וכל דבר שאינו ראוי לאכילה כלל, אם נצלה עליו כדי מאכל בן דרסאי, חייב. ¹²

One who roasts on Shabbat... is liable. And the measure of cooking and roasting for which one is liable on Shabbat is when it is cooked/roasted sufficiently. And anything that is not fit for eating at all, if it is roasted to the measure of Ma'achal Ben Derosai, he is liable.

He then continues, aligning with Rava's chiddush:

וצלי, כדין מבושל: ככותבת אחת במקום אחד חייב. ¹³

And roasting, like cooking: if a fig's bulk in one place, he is liable.

This shows that the Rambam adopts the Gemara's conclusion that Ma'achal Ben Derosai is the threshold for liability, and for tzli, a kezayit (fig's bulk) in one spot is sufficient, even if the rest of the meat is not roasted. He does not explicitly mention the "turned over" aspect of R' Yochanan's initial statement, implying that once the shiur is reached, liability is incurred regardless of whether it was turned over, as long as the act of tzli was initiated by the person.

In Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, the Rambam directly addresses the issur chametz on mincha:

אין המנחה נפסלת בחימוץ אלא אם כן היתה כשרה, אבל אם היתה פסולה כגון שיצאת חוץ למחיצה או שנטמאת וכיוצא בזה הרי המחמיצה פטור. ¹⁴

A meal offering is not disqualified by leavening unless it was fit. But if it was disqualified, such as if it went outside the partition [of the Temple courtyard] or became ritually impure, or similar, one who leavens it is exempt.

This establishes the fundamental halacha that a mincha פסולה is indeed patur from chametz, confirming the first part of the baraita. However, significantly, the Rambam does not offer a resolution to Rav Pappa's dilemma of "חימצה ויצאת וחזר וחימצה," indicating that for him, the safek remains a teiku, an unresolved question. This demonstrates the profound conceptual difficulty of the sugya's inquiry into the interplay of kiddushah, psul, and subsequent acts of chametz.

Friction

The Enigmatic Status of a "Re-Leavened" Disqualified Mincha

The strongest kushya in the sugya arises from Rav Pappa's dilemma: "חימצה ויצאת וחזר וחימצה, מהו?" ¹⁵ (If one leavened [a mincha] when it was fit, and it subsequently emerged [from the Temple courtyard] and was disqualified, and he again leavened it, what is the halakha?). The baraita explicitly states that "המחמיץ את הכשרה — חייב, ואת הפסולה — פטור" ¹⁶ (one who leavens a fit mincha is liable, but one who leavens a disqualified mincha is exempt). Given this, why is there any safek at all? Once the mincha יצאת (emerged), it is פסולה, and therefore, according to the baraita, one should clearly be patur for any subsequent chametz! The initial act of chametz already incurred liability, so why ponder a second act on an item that is now פסולה?

The Gemara itself presents the two sides of the safek:

1. "כיון דיצאת איפסילא בה ביוצא ולא מיחייב עלה משום מחמץ אחר מחמץ" ¹⁷ (Since it emerged, it was disqualified by yozei, and therefore when he again leavens it he is not liable for it due to the prohibition against leavening a meal offering after one who already leavened it). This side aligns with the simple reading of the baraita.
2. "או דלמא כיון דחימצה לא מהני ליה בה פסול יוצא" ¹⁸ (Or perhaps, since one already leavened the meal offering, from this point forward the disqualification of a sacred item that emerges from its permitted area is ineffective with regard to removing it from the prohibition against leavening). This is the challenging side. How can a psul like yozei be "ineffective" for removing a mincha from the scope of issur chametz?

The best terutz delves into the unique nature of issur chametz on mincha. Rashi, as noted above, explains the second side of the safek thus: "דלאו קדושה גמורה היא ואין בה אלא פסול חימוץ וחייב כשאר מחמץ אחר מחמץ" ¹⁹. This implies a subtle distinction: while yozei disqualifies the mincha from being offered on the altar, it doesn't completely strip away its identity as a mincha that is subject to the chametz prohibition. The mincha has already been chametz, establishing a permanent link. The psul yozei relates to the korban function of the mincha, its heksher l'mizbeach (fitness for the altar), but the issur chametz might be an inherent psul that attaches to the substance of the mincha itself, regardless of its korban viability. The second hachmatza might be seen not as a new issur on a pasul item, but as an exacerbation of the existing issur chametz on an item that, despite being yozei, retains enough of its mincha identity to remain conceptually susceptible to the chametz prohibition. It's a question of whether psul yozei functions as an ultimate "cancellation" of the mincha's sacred status for all purposes, or if some issurim (like chametz) have a deeper, more enduring attachment. The teiku suggests this conceptual friction remained unresolved.

Intertext

Shabbat 74a: The Foundational Shiur of Ma'achal Ben Derosai

The sugya's discussion of tzli on Shabbat, particularly the concept of Ma'achal Ben Derosai (food of Ben Derosai), is deeply rooted in the broader sugya of bishul on Shabbat, primarily found in Masechet Shabbat. The Gemara in Shabbat 74a defines Ma'achal Ben Derosai as food cooked to one-third of its full cooking, making it edible, albeit not fully palatable, for a particular person named Ben Derosai. ²⁰ This threshold is universally accepted as the minimum shiur for incurring chiyuv for the melacha of bishul (cooking) on Shabbat. Our sugya in Menachot takes this established principle and applies it specifically to tzli (roasting). The chiddush here is R' Yochanan's initial statement that even tzli to the shiur of Ma'achal Ben Derosai on one side is "לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא" ²¹ (nothing), unless it's turned over, implying a gmar melacha that requires both sides for tzli. However, Rava then refines this, stating that if a kezayit (fig's bulk) is roasted in one spot to Ma'achal Ben Derosai, one is liable. This illustrates how the shiur of Ma'achal Ben Derosai serves as a conceptual baseline, which is then adapted and nuanced based on the specific melacha (e.g., bishul vs. tzli) and the nature of the action.

Nedarim 35a: The Impact of Psul on Prior Kiddushah

While not a direct subject-matter parallel, the conceptual dilemma raised by Rav Pappa concerning "חימצה ויצאת וחזר וחימצה" ²² finds a thematic echo in sugyot that grapple with the impact of psul (disqualification) on items that previously held kiddushah (sanctity) or were subject to an issur. For instance, in Nedarim 35a, the Gemara discusses whether terumah or ma'aser that became pasul before hafrasha (separation) or before being brought to the kohen retroactively negates the prior kiddushah or issur. ²³ The question there is whether the psul completely divorces the item from its sacred past, or if some remnants of its original status persist, affecting subsequent actions or issurim. This is analogous to Rav Pappa's safek: does the psul yozei so fundamentally alter the mincha's status that it is entirely removed from the chametz prohibition, or does the initial act of chametz create an enduring linkage that yozei cannot fully sever for a subsequent act of chametz? Both sugyot explore the intricate question of how psulim interact with the enduring identity of consecrated items.

Psak/Practice

The discussions in our sugya have significant ramifications for halacha l'ma'aseh.

1. Shabbat - Bishul and Tzli: The shiur of Ma'achal Ben Derosai is a cornerstone of Hilchot Shabbat. The Shulchan Aruch rules that one is liable for bishul or tzli on Shabbat if the food reaches Ma'achal Ben Derosai. ²⁴ This typically refers to about one-third of the normal cooking process, when the food becomes edible for some, even if not fully cooked. For tzli, the poskim generally adopt Rava's more lenient (or precise) chiddush: liability is incurred if a kezayit (fig's bulk) is roasted in one spot to the shiur of Ma'achal Ben Derosai. ²⁵ This means that partial roasting spread out over multiple spots, even if totaling a kezayit, would not incur liability according to Rava's first opinion, though his second opinion (which is also brought) states that one is liable even if over two or three spots if they are fit to be joined. The Shulchan Aruch and Mishnah Berurah do not explicitly distinguish between one spot or multiple spots for tzli in OC 318:4, implying that the kezayit Ma'achal Ben Derosai is the key, though Acharonim discuss the various opinions.

2. Korbanot - Issur Chametz: The halacha that one is patur for leavening a mincha פסולה (e.g., יוצאת or טמאה) is accepted. ²⁶ However, Rav Pappa's safek regarding "חימצה ויצאת וחזר וחימצה" remains a teiku in the Gemara. In halacha, a teiku concerning an issur d'Oraita (Torah prohibition) typically implies chumra (strictness). However, when the teiku is about chiyuv malkut (liability for lashes), it often means ein malkut (no lashes are administered) because the doubt precludes definitive judgment. The Rishonim and Acharonim do not resolve this safek, leaving it as a complex theoretical point that would likely lead to chumra in practice (i.e., one should avoid re-leavening) but not necessarily malkut if it were to occur.

Takeaway

The sugya meticulously dissects the precise shiurim and conceptual boundaries that trigger chiyuv for melachot Shabbat and issurei korbanot, underscoring that halachic thought demands rigorous distinctions between seemingly similar actions or states of sanctity and disqualification. It reveals the profound depth in defining what constitutes a "complete act" or a "valid status" within the Torah's framework.

---

¹ Menachot 57a:1. ² Menachot 57a:5. ³ Menachot 57a:6. ⁴ Menachot 57a:10. ⁵ Menachot 57a:11. ⁶ Rashi, Menachot 57a s.v. פסולה. ⁷ Menachot 57a:11. ⁸ Rashi, Menachot 57a s.v. וחזר וחימצה. ⁹ Rashi, Menachot 57a s.v. מהו. ¹⁰ Menachot 57a:12. ¹¹ Rashi, Menachot 57a s.v. כיון דחימצה לא מהני ליה בה פסול יוצא. ¹² Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 9:5. ¹³ Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 9:5. ¹⁴ Rambam, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:14. ¹⁵ Menachot 57a:11. ¹⁶ Menachot 57a:10. ¹⁷ Menachot 57a:12. ¹⁸ Menachot 57a:12. ¹⁹ Rashi, Menachot 57a s.v. כיון דחימצה לא מהני ליה בה פסול יוצא. ²⁰ Shabbat 74a:12. ²¹ Menachot 57a:5. ²² Menachot 57a:11. ²³ Nedarim 35a:1-2. ²⁴ Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 318:4. ²⁵ Ibid. ²⁶ Rambam, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 13:14.