Menachot 58

Sugya Map

The sugya on Menachot 58a navigates several intricate halachot pertaining to korbanot, primarily focusing on the prohibitions surrounding leaven (chametz) and honey (devash) in offerings, and the broader concept of bringing consecrated items to the altar.

Core Issues

• The Derasha of "אותם" (Leviticus 2:12): What does the plural pronoun "them" exclude or include regarding the ability to bring Minchat Bikurim (specifically Shtei HaLechem) as a voluntary gift offering, either individually or communally?
• "Heter Klalo B'Mikdash": The nature of the "permission" for leaven in the Temple, contrasting it with honey, and how this relates to the Shtei HaLechem.
• Definition of "קרבן" for Ma'aleh min Ha'Isheem: The liability for bringing leftover portions of consecrated items (kodashim) onto the altar. Does the prohibition apply only to items where a part was already burned (mimmennu l'ishim) or to any item designated as an offering (kol sheshmo korban)?
• Abaye & Rava on Shiurim for Leaven/Honey: The interpretation of "כל" and "כי כל" (Leviticus 2:11) regarding the minimum quantity of leaven or honey required for liability when offered on the altar, particularly concerning k'zayit vs. kameitza.
• Abaye & Rava on Lav Shebichlalut: The principle of whether one incurs malkot (lashes) for transgressing a "general prohibition" (a single lav encompassing multiple acts) or if each distinct prohibited item (leaven, honey, their mixtures) warrants separate malkot.

Nafka Mina(s)

• Whether an individual or community may bring Shtei HaLechem as a nedavah.
• Liability for malkot for bringing b'sar chatat ha'of or log shemen shel metzora to the altar.
• The minimum shiur of leaven/honey for liability when offered on the altar.
• The number of malkot for offering a mixture of leaven and honey.

Primary Sources

• Leviticus 2:11: "כָּל־חָמֵץ וְכָל־דְּבַשׁ לֹא־תַקְטִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ אִשֶּׁה לַה'." (Any leaven and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord.)
• Leviticus 2:12: "קָרְבַּן רֵאשִׁית תַּקְרִיבוּ אֹתָם לַה' וְאֶל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ לֹא יַעֲלוּ לְרֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ." (As an offering of first produce you may bring them to the Lord, but they shall not go up to the altar for a pleasing aroma.)
• Deuteronomy 23:24: "מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ לַה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ נְדָבָה אֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתָּ בְּפִיךָ." (That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth.)
• Numbers 18:9: "כָּל־תְּרוּמַת קָדָשִׁים לִי תִּהְיֶה לְךָ וּלְבָנֶיךָ." (Every offering of theirs... shall be most holy for you and for your sons.)
• Mishna Bikkurim 3:5: Regarding fledglings on top of bikurim baskets.
• Deuteronomy 25:4: "לֹא־תַחְסֹם שׁוֹר בְּדִישׁוֹ." (You shall not muzzle an ox while it treads out the grain.)

Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with a linguistic query:

ורבי יוחנן האי "אותם" מאי עביד ליה? Menachot 58a:1:1 And what does Rabbi Yochanan do with this term: "Them," [in the verse] "As an offering of first produce you may bring them" (Leviticus 2:12)?

This question targets the derasha of "אותם" (otam, a plural masculine pronoun), which Rabbi Elazar uses to limit the prohibition of bringing Minchat Bikurim to the altar to only Shtei HaLechem and Bikurim. Rabbi Yochanan, however, holds a broader view, that the prohibition applies to all items listed in the baraita. The Gemara then presents Rabbi Yochanan's alternative derasha: "אותם" teaches that while a community can bring Shtei HaLechem as an obligatory offering, neither an individual nor a community can bring them as a nedavah (gift offering). The subsequent baraita clarifies this, using "תקריבו" (plural "you may bring") to exclude an individual nedavah, and "אותם" to exclude a communal nedavah of Shtei HaLechem.

Later, the Gemara delves into the machloket regarding ma'aleh min ha'isheem:

בעי רמי בר חמא מרב חסדא: המעלה מבשר חטאת העוף על גבי המזבח, מהו? Menachot 58a:10 Rami bar Ḥama asked Rav Ḥisda: With regard to one who offers up on the altar some of the meat of a bird sin offering, what is the halakha?

The query revolves around the scope of the prohibition against bringing consecrated items to the altar. The options are presented: "כל שממנו לאישים" (any item from which a portion is burned on the altar) or "כל ששמו קרבן" (any item called an offering). Rami bar Chamma's dilemma is framed as a machloket Tanna'im:

כתנאי: רבי אליעזר אומר: כל שממנו לאישים. רבי עקיבא אומר: כל ששמו קרבן. Menachot 58a:12 This is subject to a dispute between tanna'im: Rabbi Eliezer says: Only any item that has already had some portion of it burned in the fire on the altar. Rabbi Akiva says: Any item that is called an offering.

The nuance here is critical: chatat ha'of has its blood offered on the altar, but its meat is eaten by the priests, never burned. Thus, it falls squarely into the tension between these two definitions. Rav and Rav Chisda then offer different nafka minot for this machloket – Rav Chisda suggesting b'sar chatat ha'of, and Rav suggesting log shemen shel metzora.

Readings

The sugya presents several interpretative challenges that Rishonim and Acharonim illuminate.

Tosafot on Menachot 58a:1:1 – The Scope of "אותם"

Tosafot, in their characteristic analytical style, address the opening question of the Gemara: "ורבי יוחנן האי אותם מאי עביד ליה" (And what does Rabbi Yochanan do with this term: "Them"?). The Gemara provides a derasha for Rabbi Yochanan: "אותם" teaches that neither an individual nor a community may bring Shtei HaLechem as a nedavah. Tosafot, however, suggest an alternative, or perhaps complementary, derasha:

הוה מצי למימר דמיבעי ליה כי הא דדרשי רבנן בפ' התערובות (זבחים דף עז.) אותם אי אתה מעלה לריח ניחוח אבל אתה מעלה לשם עצים [כו']: Tosafot Menachot 58a s.v. ורבי יוחנן [The Gemara] could have said that [Rabbi Yochanan] requires it for that which the Rabbanan expound in Perek HaTa'aroves (Zevachim 77a): "Them" — you do not bring up for a pleasing aroma, but you may bring up for the sake of wood [etc.].

Chiddush: Tosafot's chiddush lies in presenting a broader application of "אותם." While the Gemara focuses on the nedavah aspect of Shtei HaLechem, Tosafot point to a derasha in Zevachim 77a. There, "אותם" from the very same verse (Leviticus 2:12) is used to distinguish between bringing Minchat Bikurim (leaven/honey) l'reiach nichoach (as a pleasing aroma, i.e., as a korban onto the altar) – which is prohibited – and bringing them l'shem eitzim (for the sake of wood, i.e., to be burned as fuel on the altar). The latter is permissible. This chiddush reveals that the word "אותם" carries multiple exegetical layers, each yielding a distinct halachic outcome. It emphasizes that a single pasuk or even a single word can be the source for several halachic distinctions, a hallmark of midrash halacha. The Gemara's choice to present one derasha does not preclude other valid interpretations found elsewhere, suggesting an underlying richness in the text.

Rashi on Menachot 58a:11:1 – Defining "כל ששמו קרבן"

Rami bar Chama's question about chatat ha'of leads to the pivotal machloket Tanna'im between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva. Rashi elucidates Rabbi Akiva's position: "כל ששמו קרבן" (any item that is called an offering).

אמר רחמנא דלא יקטירו משיריו דהכי כתיב בתר דההוא קרא קרבן ראשית ומקרא נדרש לפניו: Rashi Menachot 58a s.v. כל ששמו קרבן The Merciful One said that one should not burn from its leftovers, for so it is written after that verse, "an offering of first produce," and a verse is expounded in relation to what precedes it.

And further, regarding chatat ha'of:

עוף שמו קרבן דכתיב (ויקרא א׳:י״ד) ואם מן העוף עולה קרבנו: Rashi Menachot 58a s.v. עוף שמו קרבן A bird is called an offering, as it is written (Leviticus 1:14): "And if his offering is a burnt offering of birds."

Chiddush: Rashi's chiddush is in providing the textual basis for Rabbi Akiva's expansive definition of "קרבן." He connects the prohibition of Ma'aleh min Ha'Isheem to a broader concept of "קרבן ראשית" (Leviticus 2:12) and uses the principle of "מקרא נדרש לפניו" (a verse is expounded in relation to what precedes it) to link the prohibition to any item generally termed "קרבן." This is significant because it shifts the focus from the act of burning a part of the offering (mimmennu l'ishim) to the status of the item itself (shmo korban). By citing Leviticus 1:14 ("ואם מן העוף עולה קרבנו"), Rashi explicitly demonstrates that a bird offering, even if its meat is not burned on the altar, fundamentally carries the designation of "קרבן." This means the prohibition is not contingent on the physical burning of a portion, but on the item's consecrated identity. This conceptual distinction is crucial for understanding the breadth of kedusha and its associated halachot.

Rabbeinu Gershom on Menachot 58a:7 – Clarifying Chatat Ha'Of

Rabbeinu Gershom offers a concise yet vital clarification regarding the nature of chatat ha'of in the context of Rami bar Chama's question:

המעלה מבשר חטאת העוף למזבח להקטירו שאין דינו להיות למזבח אלא דמו: Rabbeinu Gershom Menachot 58a s.v. המעלה מבשר חטאת העוף One who brings up meat of a bird sin offering to the altar to burn it, whose proper procedure is not to be on the altar, but only its blood.

Chiddush: Rabbeinu Gershom's chiddush is one of precise contextualization. He highlights the unique procedural aspect of chatat ha'of: while its blood is offered on the altar, its meat is not burned, but rather eaten by the priests. This detail is crucial for framing Rami bar Chama's dilemma. If the meat itself is never intended for the altar's fire, then it clearly distinguishes it from offerings where a portion is burned (mimmennu l'ishim). This clarification directly sets up the nafka mina between Rabbi Eliezer's and Rabbi Akiva's positions, as chatat ha'of meat is "קרבן" but not "ממנו לאישים." Rabbeinu Gershom ensures the reader understands the specific halachic circumstances that make chatat ha'of the perfect test case for this machloket.

Friction

The sugya presents a significant point of friction when it attempts to justify the parallel treatment of leaven and honey in the baraita concerning "heter klalo b'Mikdash" (its general prohibition was permitted in the Temple).

The Strongest Kushya

The baraita (Menachot 58a) states:

בלשון חמץ, הותרה כללו במקדש. בלשון דבש, לא הותרה כללו במקדש. Menachot 58a:5 In the case of leaven, its general prohibition was permitted in the Temple. By contrast, with regard to honey, there are no circumstances in which its general prohibition was permitted in the Temple.

The Gemara then asks:

מאי הותרה כללו במקדש? לאו שתי הלחם דקא מקריבין נדבה? Menachot 58a:6 When the baraita states concerning leaven that its general prohibition was permitted in the Temple, what is this? Isn’t this referring to the halakha that the meal offering of the two loaves may be sacrificed by the community as a gift offering?

This is a powerful kushya. The Gemara's immediate assumption is that the "permission" for leaven in the Temple refers to Shtei HaLechem being offered as a nedavah. However, this directly contradicts the preceding baraita (Menachot 58a:3), which explicitly states:

יכול הקהל יביאו נדבה, כשם שהקהל מביאין חובתן כיוצא בהן? תלמוד לומר: "אותם". Menachot 58a:3 One might have thought that the community shall bring two loaves as a gift offering, as the community does bring its obligatory offering in a manner similar to those two loaves. Therefore, the verse states: “Them,” [to exclude the possibility of a communal gift offering of two loaves].

The friction is palpable: How can the baraita claim "הותרה כללו במקדש" for leaven by referencing Shtei HaLechem as a nedavah, when another baraita (derived from "אותם") explicitly forbids Shtei HaLechem as a communal nedavah? This is not merely a nuance; it's a direct, head-on contradiction between two statements attributed to the Sages.

The Best Terutz (or two)

The Gemara provides a concise and elegant terutz through Rav Amram:

אמר רב עמרם: לא, אלא דקא מיתו עם כבשין. Menachot 58a:7 Rav Amram said: No, the baraita is referring to the fact that the two loaves, which were leaven, are brought as an offering with the two lambs.

Rav Amram's terutz resolves the contradiction by reinterpreting the nature of the "permission" for leaven. He argues that the baraita referring to "הותרה כללו במקדש" for leaven does not refer to Shtei HaLechem being brought as a standalone nedavah. Rather, it refers to the fact that Shtei HaLechem are brought along with the two lambs (im hakvasim) as part of the Shavuot offering. The lambs are korbanot that do go up on the altar. Since the Shtei HaLechem are conceptually intertwined with the lambs as part of a single korban unit, their inclusion, despite being leaven, constitutes the "permission" for leaven within the Temple precincts. This is a subtle but profound distinction. The leaven itself isn't sacrificed on the altar, but it is integral to an offering that does have components sacrificed on the altar, thereby granting it a limited "permission."

The Gemara then tests this terutz:

אי הכי, ביכורים נמי, דתנן: גוזלות שעל גבי הסלים עולות, והסלים ניתנין לכהנים. Menachot 58a:8 If so, in the case of first fruits also, the fruits should be considered part of the offering that was brought with them. As we learned in a Mishna (Bikkurim 3:5): As for the fledglings that were placed on top of the baskets that contained the first fruits brought to the Temple, they would sacrifice these as burnt offerings, and the baskets themselves that were in the possession of those bringing the first fruits would be given to the priests.

This kushya posits that if Rav Amram's logic holds, then Bikurim (which contain honey, and are generally forbidden on the altar) should also have "הותרה כללו במקדש" because they are brought im haguzalot (with fledglings) which are sacrificed.

The Gemara provides a second terutz:

הני לא באו אלא ליפות את הביכורים. Menachot 58a:9 These fledglings came only to decorate the first fruits.

This terutz distinguishes between the Shtei HaLechem and the lambs, which are obligatory and form a single, integrated offering unit, and the fledglings brought with Bikurim. The fledglings are not an obligatory part of the Bikurim offering; they are merely a yippui (decoration). Therefore, they do not conceptually integrate with the Bikurim to grant the honey in the Bikurim a "permission" in the same way the lambs do for Shtei HaLechem. This dual terutz elegantly resolves the initial contradiction and refines the understanding of what constitutes "permission" for a forbidden substance within a Temple offering.

Intertext

The sugya is replete with intertextual connections, drawing from Tanakh, Mishna, and other Gemara discussions to build its conceptual framework.

The Lav Shebichlalut and Lo Tachsom

The debate between Abaye and Rava regarding malkot for "כל חמץ וכל דבש" (Leviticus 2:11) introduces the fundamental concept of "לאו שבכללות" (a general prohibition). Abaye argues that "one is not flogged for a general prohibition," a principle derived from:

כמו לאו דלא תחסום. Menachot 58a:20 Like the prohibition against muzzling. (Deuteronomy 25:4)

This refers to the derasha in Makkot 13b, which juxtaposes the lav of "לא תחסום שור בדישו" (You shall not muzzle an ox while it treads out the grain) with the verses mentioning malkot. From this, the Sages derive that malkot are only administered for a lav that is "מיוחד" (specific) and "ניתן להיקש" (subject to hekkesh - comparison), unlike a lav shebichlalut which covers a wide range of actions. The lav of "לא תקטירו" (you shall not burn) regarding leaven and honey is a prime example of such a general prohibition, as it prohibits burning any leaven and any honey, encompassing a multitude of specific instances. The machloket between Abaye and Rava and its nuances (whether one is flogged for one lav or none at all) highlights the complexity of determining culpability for malkot when a single prohibition covers multiple forbidden items or scenarios.

"כל תרומת קדשים" – Log Shemen shel Metzora

Rav, in his alternative nafka mina for the machloket of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, brings the case of the log shemen shel metzora (the log of oil of a recovered leper):

לוג שמן של מצורע, דתני לוי: "כל תרומת קדשים" – להביא לוג שמן של מצורע. Menachot 58a:14 The log of oil of a leper, as Levi teaches: "Every offering of theirs" (Numbers 18:9) – to include the log of oil of a leper.

The verse in Numbers 18:9, "כל תרומת קדשים" (Every offering of holy things), is expounded by Levi to include the log of oil of a metzora among the kodashim given to the priests. This log of oil is holy, but like the meat of chatat ha'of, it is not burned on the altar; rather, it is used by the kohen to anoint the metzora and then eaten by the kohen. Therefore, it serves as another excellent test case for the machloket between Rabbi Eliezer (who requires "ממנו לאישים" – a part burned on the altar) and Rabbi Akiva (who requires "שמו קרבן" – it is called an offering). The phrase "כל תרומת קדשים" itself is a ribbui (inclusion) and functions similarly to "כל ששמו קרבן," underscoring that the item's status as a consecrated offering, even if not destined for the altar's fire, is sufficient to categorize it as a korban for certain halachot.

Psak/Practice

The sugya in Menachot 58a, while primarily dealing with Temple-era korbanot, lays down foundational principles that reverberate through Halakha even today.

The Definition of "קרבן" and Ma'aleh Min Ha'Isheem

The machloket between Rabbi Eliezer ("כל שממנו לאישים") and Rabbi Akiva ("כל ששמו קרבן") regarding liability for bringing leftovers to the altar is codified. The Rambam rules in accordance with Rabbi Akiva:

כל שהוקדש לה' ונקרא קרבן, בין שהקטירו ממנו לאישים ובין שלא הקטירו ממנו לאישים, בין שהיה ראוי להקטיר בין שלא היה ראוי, אם העלה שיריו למזבח חייב... לפיכך המעלה מבשר חטאת העוף על גבי המזבח חייב, שהרי שמו קרבן. Rambam, Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 19:15-16 Anything that was consecrated to Hashem and is called an offering, whether a portion was burned from it on the altar or not, whether it was fit to be burned or not, if one brings its leftovers to the altar, he is liable... Therefore, one who brings meat of a bird sin offering to the altar is liable, for it is called an offering.

This psak establishes a broad understanding of kedusha and its associated prohibitions. An item's intrinsic status as "קרבן," rather than its specific function on the altar, determines the prohibition. This heuristic principle, valuing the shem korban over the specific ma'aseh ishim, is significant for understanding the sanctity of consecrated items in general.

Lav Shebichlalut and Malkot

The dispute between Abaye and Rava on lav shebichlalut is a cornerstone of Hilchot Malkot. The prevailing Halakha generally follows the view that one is not flogged for a lav shebichlalut (רמב"ם הלכות סנהדרין יט:ב; שו"ע חושן משפט תכו:ב). However, the nuances raised by Abaye's two interpretations (whether one is flogged for a single lav or none at all) highlight the careful distinction between a prohibition that is truly "general" and one that, while encompassing multiple items, can be re-read as distinct prohibitions. Rava's position, that one is flogged for each distinct prohibition (leaven, honey, leaven mixture, honey mixture), represents a stricter approach to individual culpability. The Halakha often leans towards stricter interpretations regarding issurim, but the lack of malkot for a lav shebichlalut demonstrates a specific midrashic limitation on this form of punishment, rooted in the pasuk of Lo Tachsom. This distinction is critical in any discussion of biblical punishments.

Takeaway

This sugya exemplifies the meticulousness of Torah Sheb'al Peh, demonstrating how precise linguistic analysis (derashot) yields intricate halachic distinctions regarding the sanctity of korbanot and the scope of prohibitions. Furthermore, it lays bare foundational principles concerning liability for malkot that extend beyond the specific context of Temple offerings, revealing the intricate interplay between textual interpretation, conceptual definition, and practical Halakha.