Zevachim 60

Sugya Map

The sugya on Zevachim 60a weaves together two major, yet connected, arcs of Lomdus: the architectural dimensions and consecration status of the Mishkan courtyard, and the prerequisite structural integrity of the Mizbeach (Altar) for the consumption of sacrificial portions.

Issue	Nafka Mina(s)	Primary Sources
I. Altar Dimensions & Courtyard Consecration (R. Yehuda vs. R. Yosei)	The height of the Mizbeach HaNechoshet (Copper Altar) (3 vs. 10 cubits). The status of the Azarah (Temple Courtyard) floor: Is it consecrated as an extension of the altar (Kol Ha'Azarah Mikdesha)?	Exodus 27:1; Exodus 27:18; I Kings 8:64; Ezekiel 43:16
II. Integrity of the Altar & Consumption of Kodshim	Does a damaged Mizbeach disqualify the consumption of Kodshei Kodashim (Most Holy Offerings) and Kodshim Kalim (Offerings of Lesser Sanctity)? If so, is this a disqualification of the food itself or the required location/time?	Leviticus 10:12; Deuteronomy 12:6; Numbers 18:17-18
III. Derivational Methodology	The application of Gezeirah Shavah (Verbal Analogy) and Hekesh (Juxtaposition), specifically the prohibition of Ein Darshin Davar HaNidrach b’Hekdesh (Deriving a derivation in sacrificial law).	Zevachim 60b (via R. Yishmael’s Binyan Av); Pesachim 21b

Text Snapshot

The segment opens by concluding the architectural debate regarding the Mizbeach HaNechoshet and the curtains of the Mishkan.

ומה תלמוד לומר וקומתה חמש אמות משפת מזבח ולמעלה ומה תלמוד לומר וגבהו שלש אמות משפת כרכוב ולמעלה And what [is the meaning when] the verse states: “And the height five cubits” (Exodus 27:18)? It is referring to the height of the curtains from the upper edge of the altar and above; the curtains surrounding the courtyard were five cubits higher than the altar. . . And what [is the meaning when] the verse states: “And its height shall be three cubits” (Exodus 27:1)? The verse means that the altar measures three cubits from the edge of the surrounding ledge and above. (Zevachim 60a:1)

This interpretation, attributed to R. Yosei, sets the stage for the crucial nafka mina regarding the Azarah's status:

ואם סלקא דעתך סבר ר' יהודה כולה עזרה מיקדשא הא איתעבידא ליה מצוותיה And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Yehuda maintains the entire Temple courtyard was consecrated so that it had the status of the altar, then the mitzva of sacrificing the Paschal offering was performed [even if the blood spilled on the ground]. (Zevachim 60a:10)

The sugya pivots abruptly to R. Elazar’s dictum:

אמר ר' אלעזר מזבח שנפגם אין אוכלין בגינו שירי מנחה שנאמר (ויקרא י, יב) קחו את המנחה... ואכלוה מצות אצל המזבח כי קדש קדשים היא Rabbi Elazar says: In the case of an altar that was damaged, one may not eat the remainder of a meal offering on its account, as it is stated: “Take the meal offering…and eat it without leaven beside the altar (etzel haMizbeach); for it is most holy” (Leviticus 10:12). (Zevachim 60a:13)

Dikduk Nuance: Etzel HaMizbeach

Rashi immediately raises the linguistic difficulty: V’chi etzel haMizbeach achluha? (Did they only eat it beside the altar?)¹. Since the Azarah is the designated area for consumption of Kodshei Kodashim, the placement of the word etzel (beside) is superfluous unless it refers not to physical proximity but to functional presence. R. Elazar thus interprets etzel haMizbeach not as "physically adjacent," but bizman shehu shalem (at a time when it is complete). This transformation of a spatial requirement into a temporal/structural prerequisite is the core chiddush of this section.

Leshon Nuance: B'Gino

R. Elazar states ein ochlin b'gino shiyerei mincha (one may not eat the remainder of a meal offering on its account). Rashi glosses b'gino as bishvilo (because of it)². The Mincha itself is not physically part of the altar, yet its validity for consumption hinges on the altar's state. This reinforces the idea that the altar is not just a location for Avodah, but a prerequisite for the entire sanctity system to function, including the permission to consume its byproducts.

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Readings

The sugya presents two distinct, deep halakhic problems: the spatial consecration of the Azarah and the temporal/structural prerequisite of the Mizbeach for consumption. The Rishonim and Acharonim dissect these issues, offering fundamental lomdus on the nature of kedushah and sacrificial validity.

Reading 1: Rashi (The Nature of Kedushat Ha'Azarah)

Rashi's approach to the R. Yehuda/R. Yosei dispute focuses on the scope of kedushah conferred upon the courtyard. R. Yehuda’s position, that Kol Ha’Azarah Mikdesha (the entire courtyard is consecrated with the status of the altar) requires careful analysis, especially when challenged by Rava regarding the requirement to pour the mixed blood onto the altar itself (Zevachim 60a:10).

Rashi’s Interpretation of Rava’s Proof

Rava argues that if the Azarah floor were truly consecrated as an altar, then the blood, which spilled onto the floor during the handling of the Paschal offerings, would already have fulfilled the Mitzvah of Zrikah (sprinkling/pouring) for that portion of the offering. If the entire floor holds the status of the Mizbeach—the locus of Zrikah—then the spilled blood is considered zruk (sprinkled). Rashi clarifies the implication: Ha it’avidah lei mitzvatei (the Mitzvah was performed)³.

However, the Gemara rejects Rava's proof with two terutzim (resolutions), the second being Mitzvah min Ha'Muvchar (optimal performance). According to this terutz, even if the Azarah floor is consecrated b'dieved (post-facto), R. Yehuda requires the blood to be poured onto the physical structure of the Mizbeach itself l'chatchila (ideally). Rashi implicitly understands R. Yehuda's kedushah to be a form of kedushat makom (holiness of place) that permits burning and certain sacrificial acts, but perhaps not the primary, quintessential act of Zrikah which defines the offering’s validity. This leaves the Azarah with a secondary kedushah, sufficient for burning (as in I Kings 8:64) but not entirely equivalent to the Mizbeach for all Avodot (services) related to life-giving blood.

Reading 2: Rambam (The Structural Prerequisite for Consumption)

The Rambam, in codifying the halakha of Mizbeach shenifgam, provides a structural underpinning to R. Elazar’s derivation. He rules unequivocally that if the Mizbeach is damaged—lacking even a single stone or if its dimensions are incorrect—no Kodshim may be eaten, whether Kodshei Kodashim or Kodshim Kalim.

The Scope of Pesul (Disqualification)

In Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin, the Rambam discusses the various ways an offering can be disqualified. The disqualification arising from a damaged altar is unique. It is not an intrinsic flaw in the kodesh itself (like piggul or notar), nor is it a simple lack of location, as the entire Azarah remains consecrated. Rather, the Rambam views the integrity of the Mizbeach as a necessary hachsharah (preparation/enabling factor) for the consumption phase.

The phrase Etzel HaMizbeach (Zevachim 60a:13) means that the permission to eat is conditioned upon the entire system of Avodah being operable. If the Mizbeach is damaged, it cannot perform the Avodah effectively, and consequently, the derived benefit—the right of the priests to consume the meat—is suspended. This is crucial because it distinguishes this pesul from other flaws. If an offering were eaten in a damaged Azarah when the Mizbeach was intact, the person would violate a negative commandment concerning the place of eating. If the Mizbeach is damaged, however, the offering’s kashrut for consumption is nullified entirely, regardless of the physical location within the valid eating area. The Mizbeach serves as the functional heart of the Temple; when the heart fails, the body (consumption rights) cannot be sustained.⁴

Reading 3: Tosafot (The Strictures of Hekdesh Derivations)

The final segment of the sugya (Zevachim 60b) delves into the complex legal methodology of deriving halakhot for Kodshim (sacrificial items) and Chulin (non-sacred items like Ma'aser Sheni). This is critical for understanding Abaye's attempt to prove the Mizbeach Shenifgam rule applies to Kodshim Kalim via Ma'aser Sheni, using the Hekesh (juxtaposition) of Ma'aser Sheni and Bechor (Firstborn) in the verse (Deuteronomy 12:6).

Ein Darshin Davar HaNidrach b’Hekdesh

The Gemara raises a fatal objection to deriving Ma'aser Sheni from Bechor, which was itself derived from the juxtaposition of its Basar (meat) and its Dam (blood) (Numbers 18:17-18). The principle is Ein Darshin Davar HaNidrach b’Hekdesh—you cannot use a halakha that was itself derived through a primary derivation concerning Hekdesh matters to then derive a third halakha.

Tosafot addresses the Gemara's resolution: Dam u'Basar chada milta hi (Blood and meat are one matter)⁵. The Gemara concludes that the Bechor is not a derived matter; rather, the Hekesh between blood and meat is considered a single, primary derivation.

Tosafot inquires: Why is the prohibition of davar ha'nidrach necessary at all? If two items are juxtaposed in a verse, why can’t we derive one from the other, and then use the second item to derive a third, regardless of whether they are Hekdesh?

Tosafot explains that the principle applies specifically to Gezeirah Shavah (Verbal Analogy) and Hekesh used within Hekdesh matters, which are deemed more sensitive and require stricter adherence to the text's explicit meaning. The derivation of Ma'aser Sheni (which is Chulin for the purpose of this rule) from Bechor (which is Hekdesh) is permissible because the derived matter dictates the rule: Batrah Azlinan (We follow the derived matter)⁶. Since Ma'aser Sheni is Chulin, the strict rules of Hekdesh derivations are relaxed. This analysis by Tosafot clarifies the Middot She'HaTorah Nidreshet Bahen (rules of interpretation) and their hierarchical application based on the sanctity level of the subjects involved, providing a fundamental methodological tool for lomdus.

Reading 4: Maharsha (Synthesizing the Two Sugyot)

The Maharsha often seeks to find internal coherence where the Talmud seems to move between distinct topics. Here, the two main sugyot—R. Yehuda’s Kol Ha’Azarah Mikdesha and R. Elazar’s Mizbeach Shenifgam—can be connected through the concept of the altar’s functional necessity.

The Functional Altar as the Source of Hachsharah

The Maharsha suggests that R. Yehuda's position regarding the Azarah being consecrated as an altar extension is limited by the very structure of the Mizbeach itself. The Azarah is only consecrated to burn fats because it is adjacent to a functioning altar. If R. Elazar's rule holds—that consumption is suspended when the Mizbeach is damaged—it demonstrates that the altar's integrity is the machshir (enabling factor) for all subsequent kedushah in the courtyard, including the ability to dispose of the consumed portions.

The dispute between R. Yehuda and R. Yosei regarding the dimensions of the altar (Zevachim 60a:8) hinges on the source of the Gezeirah Shavah (Ribua, "square"). R. Yehuda learns Ribua for the width (10x10), while R. Yosei learns it for the height (10 cubits).

Maharsha implies that R. Yehuda’s larger altar (10x10) necessitated the concept of Kol Ha’Azarah Mikdesha for practical reasons during the large sacrifices of Shlomo (I Kings 8:64). Yet, even with this expansive view of the Azarah, the physical, structural Mizbeach remains the sine qua non for the entire sacrificial operation. The physical structure, not merely the consecrated ground, acts as the primary hachsharah. Thus, R. Elazar's rule functions as a constraint on R. Yehuda’s expansive view: the Azarah may be consecrated for burning, but its function is dependent on the primary Mizbeach being shalem (complete).

This synthesis underscores that kedushah is often hierarchical and conditional, rather than absolute or purely spatial. The Azarah derives its ability to function from the continuous integrity of the Mizbeach structure.

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Friction

The sugya is rich with internal contradictions, most notably the challenge to R. Yehuda's maximalist view of courtyard consecration and the logical basis for R. Elazar's rule regarding the damaged altar.

Friction 1: The Blood Conundrum (Rava's Challenge)

Kushya: The Scope of Kol Ha'Azarah Mikdesha

R. Yehuda holds that the entire courtyard is consecrated with the status of the altar, thereby permitting the burning of offerings there, as demonstrated by King Solomon’s dedication (I Kings 8:64). Rava challenges this (Zevachim 60a:10) concerning the Paschal blood that spilled onto the floor. If the floor is consecrated as an altar, why does R. Yehuda require the priest to gather a cup of the mixed blood and pour it onto the Mizbeach structure itself, specifically to compensate for any spilled blood? If the floor is the altar, the mitzvah of Zrikah (sprinkling/pouring) was already completed upon contact with the consecrated floor.

This contradiction strikes at the heart of R. Yehuda's chiddush. If the consecration is complete, it must apply to the defining Avodah of the blood, not just the secondary act of burning the fats.

Terutz 1: Shfichah MiKoch Ha’Adam (Human Force)

The Gemara initially suggests that R. Yehuda requires the pouring onto the Mizbeach because Shfichah MiKoch Ha’Adam Ba’inan (We require the pouring to be done by human force) (Zevachim 60a:11)⁷. The blood that initially spilled onto the floor was accidental; it was not an intentional sacrificial act. Therefore, even if the floor is consecrated, the Avodah was not performed.

However, the Gemara refutes this: Im kein, nishkilei v'nishpich lei a'duchtei (If so, let him take [the cup] and pour it in its place [on the floor])⁸. If the floor is consecrated and the only requirement is intentional human action, the priest should simply pour the mixed blood back onto the spot where the original blood spilled. The fact that he must pour it onto the Mizbeach structure indicates that the floor, despite its consecration status, is functionally inferior to the Mizbeach itself regarding the essential act of Zrikah.

This refutation pushes the analysis deeper: the flaw is not merely the lack of intentionality, but the lack of the precise, primary locus for Zrikah.

Terutz 2: Mitzvah Min Ha'Muvchar (Optimal Performance)

The final, accepted terutz is d'lima mishum d'ba'inan Mitzvah Min Ha'Muvchar (Perhaps because we require the optimal performance of the Mitzvah) (Zevachim 60a:12)⁹.

This terutz is highly nuanced. It implies that R. Yehuda’s position that Kol Ha’Azarah Mikdesha is halakha regarding the kashrut of the location (makom)—meaning, if someone intentionally poured the blood on the floor, the offering would be kasher b'dieved (valid post-facto). However, the Mitzvah min Ha'Muvchar requirement dictates that l'chatchila (ideally), the Avodah must be performed on the physical Mizbeach structure.

The Chiddush here is that R. Yehuda views the Azarah's consecration as a safety net or an expansion of the burning area, but it does not diminish the primary importance of the Mizbeach structure for the core Avodot. The Mizbeach is the makom kavua (fixed, optimal location) for Zrikah, and even a master rule like Kol Ha'Azarah Mikdesha does not override the standard for Mitzvah min Ha'Muvchar. This distinction between kashrut and mitzva (legal validity versus ideal performance) is a bedrock principle in halakha.

Friction 2: The Logical Leap of Mizbeach Shenifgam

Kushya: The Nature of Location vs. Structure

R. Elazar derives that Mizbeach shenifgam, ein ochlin b'gino shiyerei mincha from Va'achluha matzot etzel haMizbeach (Leviticus 10:12). As Rashi notes, this is puzzling: the general rule is that Kodshei Kodashim can be consumed anywhere in the Azarah (Zevachim 60a:13:2). Why does the structural integrity of the altar dictate the validity of eating consecrated food, which is permitted throughout the courtyard?

If the altar is merely the location for Avodah, then as long as the eating occurs in the consecrated Azarah, the food should be fine. The Gemara's interpretation that etzel haMizbeach means bizman shehu shalem (at a time when it is complete) forces a non-literal, temporal reading onto a spatial term. What is the fundamental logical connection between the altar's structural state and the priest's right to eat the Mincha?

Terutz 1: The Altar as Hachsharat Kodesh (Enabling Sanctity)

The strongest terutz is that the Mizbeach functions as the central Hachsharah for the entire system of Kodshim. The process of Mincha (meal offering) requires kemitza (taking a handful) and haktarah (burning). These acts must be performed on the altar. The remaining portion (Shirayim) is permitted to the priests only because the acts performed on the altar were valid.

If the altar is damaged (nifgam), any Avodah performed upon it is pasul (invalid). Since the Shirayim are defined legally by the valid Avodah of the Kometz (handful) and Haktarah, a damaged altar means the prior Avodah failed to "release" the Shirayim for consumption. The structure of the altar is therefore a necessary condition (tenai) for the kashrut of the consumption phase.

This interpretation means that the pesul is retroactive: the Mincha was never truly released from its status as an offering requiring Avodah. The Azarah remains consecrated as a location, but the kodshim themselves are invalidated for consumption due to a defect in the required machshir (the altar).

Terutz 2: The Altar as the Siman (Sign) of Service

An alternative, though related, approach views the altar’s integrity as a symbolic or legal siman that the Temple is fully operational. The verse states: etzel haMizbeach ki Kodesh Kodashim hi (Beside the altar, for it is Most Holy). The juxtaposition suggests that the Kedushat Kodashim status, which grants the priest the right to eat the remainder, is intrinsically linked to the immediate, functional presence of the altar.

If the altar is damaged, even if the Avodah performed before the damage was technically valid, the immediate sanctity of the Temple has been compromised, suspending the associated benefits. This interpretation resonates with the second part of the sugya (Zevachim 60b), where the rule is extended to Kodshim Kalim and even Ma'aser Sheni—items whose kashrut is tied to the existence of the Temple structure itself, regardless of whether a specific Avodah (like haktarah) was performed on them. The altar's completeness signals the operational status of the entire Temple complex.

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Intertext

The discussions on Zevachim 60a provide vital links to foundational concepts across Tanakh, Seder Kodashim, and even Seder Mo'ed, regarding kedushah, architecture, and legal derivation.

Intertext 1: Kedushat HaMikdash L'Olam (Megillah 10a)

The sugya touches upon the seminal debate regarding the endurance of Temple sanctity: Kidesho l'sha'ato u'kidesho l'olam (Did the initial consecration sanctify it for its time and sanctify it forever?) (Zevachim 60b:18-19). This is the same critical inquiry found in Megillah 10a concerning the sanctity of Jerusalem and the Azarah floor.

The nafka mina in Zevachim is immediate: If the sanctity endures, why can’t we eat Bechor meat nowadays, since the location is holy? Ravina resolves this by stating we deal with Bechor whose blood was sprinkled before the destruction (Zevachim 60b:20). He then relies on a Hekesh (juxtaposition) in Numbers 18:17-18: Just as its blood [is sprinkled] on the altar, so too its meat [is consumed only] in [the presence of] an altar. The meat's consumption is tied not just to the holy location, but to the functional presence of the altar.

This resolution confirms the resilience of the Kedushah of the Azarah floor (kidesho l'olam), while simultaneously affirming R. Elazar's rule (via Ravina's application to Bechor) that the functional altar is a prerequisite for consumption, even in a perpetually holy place. The Bechor is pasul not because the Azarah is chulin, but because the necessary structural component (Mizbeach shalem) is missing.

Intertext 2: The Altar Dimensions and Prophecy (Ezekiel 43:16)

The dispute between R. Yehuda and R. Yosei regarding the dimensions of the Copper Altar relies on a Gezeirah Shavah from the word Ribua (square), linking the Altar of the Mishkan (Exodus 27:1) to the Altar described by Ezekiel (Ezekiel 43:16).

R. Yehuda learns the Gezeirah Shavah regarding the width (10x10 cubits), while R. Yosei learns it regarding the height (10 cubits). R. Yehuda’s reliance on Ezekiel is rooted in the principle that we derive the dimensions of the Mizbeach Chitzon (Outer Altar) from the Mizbeach Chitzon of the future Temple, rather than the Mizbeach Penimi (Inner Incense Altar) of the Mishkan (Zevachim 60a:8).

This intertextual move highlights a critical methodological decision: when faced with two potential sources for a derivation, should one prefer internal consistency within a structure (R. Yosei: vessel from vessel, i.e., Outer Altar from Inner Altar) or external consistency across time/type (R. Yehuda: Outer Altar from future Outer Altar)? This demonstrates the use of prophetic texts (Ezekiel) not just for future law, but for clarifying ambiguities in the foundational Torah law itself.¹⁰

Intertext 3: Consumption Outside Jerusalem (Ma'aser Sheni and Bechor)

The sugya uses Ma'aser Sheni and Bechor to derive the rule of Mizbeach shenifgam for Kodshim Kalim (Zevachim 60b:3). This chain of derivation relies heavily on Deuteronomy 12:6, which lists items brought to the Makom Asher Yivchar HaShem (the chosen place):

“And there you shall bring your burnt offerings, and your sacrifices, and your tithes…and the firstborns of your herd and of your flock” (Deuteronomy 12:6).

The discussion focuses on why Ma'aser Sheni (tithe) cannot be consumed after the Temple's destruction, even though it does not require Zrikah or Haktarah. The Bechor, which does require Zrikah, proves that consumption is only permissible Bifnei HaBayit (in the presence of the Temple). The Ma'aser Sheni is then derived from Bechor via Hekesh.

The underlying tension across Seder Kodashim and Seder Zera'im is the distinction between Kodshim (sacrifices) and Terumot/Ma'aserot (priestly/tithe gifts). The former are intrinsically tied to the Mizbeach by blood and fat; the latter are tied to the Makom (Jerusalem). This sugya's conclusion—that even Ma'aser Sheni is tied to the functional presence of the Mizbeach—elevates the altar’s role from a mere recipient of Avodah to the central enabler of all kedushah consumption in the holy city.

Intertext 4: The Principle of Davar HaNidrach B’Hekdesh (Pesachim 21b)

The methodological debate regarding whether one can derive a derivation (davar ha'nidrach) is a recurring theme. The Gemara's discussion (Zevachim 60b:22) clarifies that Basar (meat) and Dam (blood) of the Bechor are considered chada milta (one matter), thus making the derivation to Ma'aser Sheni permissible, as it bypasses the two-step derivation constraint.

This principle is thoroughly explored in Pesachim 21b regarding She'eilah (asking a question) on Hekdesh. The general rule is that derashot (interpretations) related to Hekdesh must be handled with extreme caution, often requiring explicit textual support where Chulin laws might permit greater inferential leaps. The relaxation of the rule here, based on Batrah Azlinan (following the status of the derived matter, Ma'aser Sheni, which is chulin for this purpose)¹¹, establishes a specific legal heuristic: when a Hekdesh item teaches a Chulin item, the interpretive stringency diminishes. This shows the Talmud’s commitment to internal methodological consistency across different tractates.

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Psak/Practice

The sugya provides foundational principles in both Temple architecture and the enduring nature of sanctity, leading to critical halakhic rulings.

The Status of Mizbeach Shenifgam

The ruling of R. Elazar—Mizbeach shenifgam, ein ochlin b'gino shiyerei mincha—is adopted as normative Halakha. The Rishonim universally agree that the functional integrity of the altar is a prerequisite for the consumption of Kodshim.

The Rambam codifies this ruling clearly: "If the Altar was damaged, or if it lacked even one stone, they may not eat from the remains of the Meal Offering, nor the meat of the Most Holy Offerings, nor the meat of Offerings of Lesser Sanctity, nor the hides, nor the First Fruits, nor Ma'aser Sheni..."¹². This expansive list, derived from the Binyan Av and the Hekesh presented in Zevachim 60b, confirms that the Mizbeach’s integrity acts as a machshir (enabler) for all consecrated items whose consumption is dependent on the Temple area. The psak focuses on the temporal requirement (bizman shehu shalem) over the spatial requirement.

R. Yehuda and Meta-Psak Heuristics

While R. Yehuda's specific dimension of 10x10 cubits for the Copper Altar is generally rejected in favor of R. Yosei's 5x5 cubits (as evident in Midot 3:1), his concept of Kol Ha'Azarah Mikdesha remains relevant through the lens of Mitzvah min Ha'Muvchar.

The psak confirms that while the Azarah floor is consecrated and fit for secondary acts of the altar (like burning wood and fat, as per I Kings 8:64), the l'chatchila (ideal) requirement for essential Avodot (especially Zrikah) remains the specific structure of the Mizbeach. This establishes a heuristic in halakhic decision-making: even when a broad permission exists (e.g., consecration of the entire floor), the specific, mandated makom (location) for the core mitzvah maintains its superior status for optimal performance.

Kedushat HaMikdash Achar Churban (Sanctity After Destruction)

The sugya's conclusion that the pesul of Bechor meat is due to the lack of a functional altar, and not the loss of the Kedushat Makom, is crucial. This reinforces the accepted psak that Kedushah Rishonah Kideshah L'Olam (the initial consecration sanctified it forever). The Rambam, again, rules this explicitly in Hilchot Beit HaBechirah.¹³

This meta-psak heuristic dictates modern practice: even today, the Temple Mount retains its sanctity, requiring adherence to all entry and purity restrictions. The Avodah is suspended because the Mizbeach is nifgam (damaged/missing) and we lack the necessary purity requirements, but the Makom itself is eternally holy. The sugya thus separates the Kedushah of the location (eternal) from the Kashrut of the offerings (conditional on the Altar’s structural integrity).

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Takeaway

The sugya demonstrates that the validity of the sacrificial system hinges on the functional, structural integrity of the Mizbeach, distinguishing between the eternal Kedushat Makom and the conditional Kashrut of the Kodshim, which is suspended when the heart of the Avodah is compromised.

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Citations

1. Rashi on Zevachim 60a:13:2 s.v. V'chi etzel haMizbeach achluha.
2. Rashi on Zevachim 60a:13:1 s.v. B'gino.
3. Steinsaltz on Zevachim 60a:10 s.v. V'im salka da'atchu.
4. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 11:2.
5. Tosafot on Zevachim 60b:23 s.v. Dam u'basar chada milta hi.
6. Tosafot on Zevachim 60b:22 s.v. L'man d'amar batrah azlinan.
7. Steinsaltz on Zevachim 60a:11 s.v. V'dilma ein hu matzrich.
8. Steinsaltz on Zevachim 60a:11 s.v. Im ken nishkeliah v'nishpich lei a'duchtei.
9. Steinsaltz on Zevachim 60a:12 s.v. V'dilma lo hitzrich.
10. Zevachim 60a:7 s.v. Mizbeach chitzon.
11. Zevachim 60b:22 s.v. L'man d'amar batrah azlinan.
12. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Me'ilah 1:17.
13. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6:15.